Russia and China have both embraced BRICS as a platform to advance a more multipolar world order and to amplify the voice of emerging powers in global affairs. They often portray BRICS as an alternative to Western-led groupings like the G7, emphasizing sovereign equality<\/strong> and development for the Global South cepa.org<\/a>. For Moscow, BRICS serves as a vehicle to counterbalance Western dominance<\/strong> and rehabilitate Russia\u2019s international image after its isolation by the West \u2013 especially following widespread condemnation of the Ukraine war cepa.org<\/a>. President Vladimir Putin has explicitly cast BRICS as \u201ca pillar of the multipolar world\u201d and a milestone in the fight against U.S. hegemony blog.bti-project.org<\/a>. Beijing shares the goal of challenging U.S.-centric structures, viewing BRICS as a complementary venue to its own initiatives (such as the Belt and Road) for reshaping global governance carnegieendowment.org<\/a>blog.bti-project.org<\/a>. Chinese officials highlight that the China-Russia partnership \u201cmoves ahead along the trend of the times toward multipolarity and greater democracy in international relations\u201d \u2013 a new paradigm distinct from Cold War-era blocs mfa.gov.cn<\/a>. Both powers thus see BRICS as a means to reform the international system<\/strong> to give non-Western countries greater influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet, within this general alignment, Russia\u2019s and China\u2019s strategic aims diverge in nuance and priority<\/strong>. Beijing\u2019s vision tends to be broader and more future-oriented: China uses BRICS to supplement its global leadership aspirations, promote a development-centric agenda, and build networks in the Global Southcepa.org<\/a>. Moscow\u2019s approach is more defensive and immediate: Russia leans on BRICS to validate its great-power status<\/strong> and break out of geopolitical isolation cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. For example, Russia has tried to frame BRICS as sympathetic to its narratives and an implicit counterweight to the West, to show it still has powerful friends cepa.org<\/a>. China, which doesn\u2019t share Moscow\u2019s need for diplomatic \u201crehabilitation,\u201d has been willing to accommodate Russia\u2019s rhetoric up to a point \u2013 occasionally softening or recalibrating the tone<\/strong> to maintain the group\u2019s balance cepa.org<\/a>. This dynamic was evident in BRICS statements on the Ukraine conflict: the joint declarations simply \u201crecall our national positions\u201d and affirm principles of the UN Charter, without condemning or endorsing Russia\u2019s actions cepa.org<\/a>. Such carefully neutral language<\/strong> (reiterating respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity) was a diplomatic compromise that avoided isolating Russia<\/strong> while not forcing China (or others) to explicitly defend Moscow\u2019s war cepa.org<\/a>. In effect, China and Russia coordinated to keep BRICS unified and focused on less divisive issues, rather than let the Ukraine issue split the bloc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Importantly, both countries stress that their partnership \u2013 even as it drives coordination in BRICS \u2013 is not<\/em> a formal alliance. They often describe it as a \u201ccomprehensive strategic partnership\u201d or even a \u201cfriendship with no limits,\u201d<\/strong> but it deliberately lacks treaty obligations cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. This non-alliance stance is by design: it preserves flexibility for each side. Beijing and Moscow prize strategic autonomy and have a history of shifting relationships, so they avoid binding military alliances. The result is a cooperative but interest-driven alignment. As one analysis put it, their political alignment is best seen as a friendship rather than a classical alliance<\/strong>, with each free to take independent actions and even diverge at times cepa.org<\/a>. This approach creates strategic ambiguity<\/em> for outsiders and maneuvering room for China and Russia themselves cepa.org<\/a>. For instance, Russia can test certain international norms or float initiatives (such as proposals in the UN or new BRICS programs) and China can choose whether to endorse or distance itself from those moves cepa.org<\/a>. Both see benefit in this arrangement: China gains a partner that challenges Western hegemony on multiple fronts, and Russia retains enough independence to not appear a subservient junior ally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In summary, strategically within BRICS<\/strong> both nations are aligned in challenging the Western-dominated status quo and championing multipolarity, but they calibrate their efforts differently. China\u2019s goals within BRICS include bolstering its image as leader of the Global South and expanding its economic reach, while Russia\u2019s goals center on demonstrating it is not isolated and that it remains a key global player. These goals largely complement<\/strong> each other despite some differences in emphasis. Going forward, we can expect Beijing and Moscow to continue leveraging BRICS to push for reforms in global governance (e.g. advocating UN Security Council changes, or new financial mechanisms) and to jointly present an ideological alternative to Western \u201cbloc\u201d politics mfa.gov.cn<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. However, they will likely maintain the loose, non-binding nature of their alignment \u2013 a \u201cno limits\u201d partnership in rhetoric<\/strong> that masks very real limits in practice. This allows them to stand united on broad principles while quietly navigating any disagreements behind the scenes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Figure: Russia-China trade (in US$ billions) surged to record levels by 2024 but showed signs of leveling off in 2025. The chart illustrates bilateral trade volume from 2019 through 2025 (2025 data through July), highlighting the sharp post-2022 increase and slight dip in early 2025. reuters.com<\/a>fpri.org<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Bilateral Trade Boom and Complementarity:<\/strong> Economic ties between China and Russia have deepened dramatically, especially after 2022, reaching unprecedented levels of trade. In 2022, as Russia pivoted away from Europe due to sanctions, China stepped in as a major buyer of Russian commodities and supplier of goods. This propelled bilateral trade to record highs<\/strong>: about $190 billion in 2022 and then $240\u2013245 billion in 2023\u20132024<\/strong>, smashing the earlier target of $200 billion which they met ahead of schedule<\/em> mfa.gov.cn<\/a>reuters.com<\/a>. By 2024, Russia-China trade turnover hit roughly $245\u00a0billion reuters.com<\/a>, a milestone that underscores how vital they have become to each other economically. This boom has been fueled by a surge in Russian exports of energy and raw materials<\/strong> to China and a parallel flood of Chinese manufactured products, machinery, and electronics into the Russian market reuters.com<\/a>fpri.org<\/a>. In practical terms, Russian oil, gas, coal, metals, and agricultural goods are exchanging for Chinese cars, telecommunications equipment, consumer electronics, and other high value goods. The two economies are often described as naturally complementary<\/em>: Russia is a vast resource exporter with needs for technology and consumer items, while China is a manufacturing powerhouse hungry for energy \u2013 a classic commodity-for-industry exchange cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This complementarity, however, comes with a clear imbalance<\/strong>. China\u2019s economy is much larger and more diversified than Russia\u2019s, translating into an unequal trade relationship. China is now by far Russia\u2019s top trading partner \u2013 accounting for about 36% of Russia\u2019s total trade<\/strong> \u2013 whereas Russia makes up only roughly 5\u20136% of China\u2019s trade<\/strong> fpri.org<\/a>. In other words, Russia depends on access to China\u2019s market and imports far more than China depends on Russia\u2019s. Although China is Russia\u2019s largest trading partner, Russia remains a relatively minor<\/em> slice of China\u2019s global trade portfolio fpri.org<\/a>. This asymmetry means Moscow needs Beijing economically more than vice versa. The pattern of trade reinforces this: Russia exports mostly raw materials<\/strong> (oil, gas, minerals, timber) and imports mostly finished goods<\/strong> and technology from China fpri.org<\/a>. Such a structure has benefitted both \u2013 Russia found a critical lifeline for sanctioned goods and a source of revenue when European markets closed, while China gained a stable supply of discounted energy and a new market for its companies cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. But it also feeds Russian anxieties about becoming overly dependent on China or relegated to being \u201cChina\u2019s gas station.\u201d Russian analysts sometimes warn of the country turning into a \u201cresource appendage\u201d<\/strong> of China, noting that outside of arms and military tech, Russia is contributing little in terms of high-tech or value-added exports fpri.org<\/a>. This unease has occasionally spurred Russia to push back on economic integration that it feels might be one-sided \u2013 for instance, Moscow has been slow to agree to Beijing\u2019s proposals for a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and has guarded certain sectors to protect its industries fpri.org<\/a>. Despite these frictions (discussed more later), the overall trajectory of trade is upward, and both governments have lauded the \u201cstrong resilience and broad prospects\u201d of their economic cooperation mfa.gov.cn<\/a>mfa.gov.cn<\/a>. It\u2019s telling that even in 2025, when bilateral trade saw a slight dip (down ~8% year-on-year in the first half, after the previous year\u2019s peak), officials on both sides immediately began seeking ways to boost trade further<\/strong>, targeting sectors like agriculture and new energy projects to rekindle growth reuters.com<\/a>reuters.com<\/a>. This indicates a commitment to continue expanding commercial ties in the long run.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Deepening Energy Partnership:<\/strong> Energy trade forms the backbone of the Sino-Russian economic relationship. Since Western sanctions in 2022, China has dramatically increased its intake of Russian oil and gas, becoming Russia\u2019s crucial energy customer. China \u2013 the world\u2019s largest oil importer \u2013 ignored Western oil sanctions and price caps<\/strong> on Russia, instead taking advantage of discounted prices to ramp up purchases reuters.com<\/a>. In 2024, Chinese crude oil imports from Russia hit an all-time high: China bought about 108.5 million tons of Russian crude that year<\/strong> (including both seaborne and pipeline supplies), equivalent to roughly 2.17 million barrels per day<\/em> reuters.com<\/a>. This was a slight increase (about 1% up) from 2023 and came even as China trimmed imports from other suppliers like Saudi Arabia reuters.com<\/a>. By this measure, Russia has either matched or surpassed Saudi Arabia as China\u2019s single largest crude supplier. Much of this oil comes via the ESPO pipeline spur into Northeast China and tankers from Russia\u2019s Far East ports, often at prices below global benchmarks \u2013 a win-win where Russia secures a huge buyer and China saves on cost. There are reports that Russia even routed more oil through third countries or via \u201cshadow fleet\u201d tankers to reach China and other Asian buyers, underscoring how critical the Chinese market is after Europe largely cut off Russian oil. Moscow has also explored new routes, such as increasing oil transit via Kazakhstan, to send additional volumes to China beyond established pipelines reuters.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On natural gas<\/strong>, a major strategic shift is underway. Historically, Russia sent the bulk of its natural gas westward to Europe. After 2014 (Crimea sanctions) and especially 2022, Russia began reorienting gas flows to the east. The Power of Siberia 1<\/strong> pipeline \u2013 a 3,000 km pipeline that came online in 2019 \u2013 has rapidly increased deliveries of Siberian gas to China reuters.com<\/a>. In 2024, Russia supplied roughly 31 billion cubic meters (bcm)<\/strong> of gas through this pipeline, and it\u2019s on track to reach the full contracted volume of 38 bcm per year by 2025 reuters.com<\/a>reuters.com<\/a>. While still small compared to Russia\u2019s pre-war gas sales to Europe, this pipeline has created a new artery of long-term energy interdependence (it\u2019s under a 30-year, $400 billion deal). In addition, in early 2022 China agreed to import up to 10 bcm<\/strong> annually from Russia via a planned new Far East pipeline (from Sakhalin island), expected around 2026\u201327 reuters.com<\/a>. The most ambitious project is the proposed Power of Siberia 2<\/strong> pipeline, which would run from Russia\u2019s huge West Siberian gas fields (the same fields that fed Europe) through Mongolia into China. After years of talks with no breakthrough, Russia announced in September 2025 that Gazprom and China\u2019s CNPC had finally signed a legally binding memorandum on Power of Siberia 2 thediplomat.com<\/a>. The pipeline, if built, is slated to carry 50 bcm<\/strong> of gas annually \u2013 effectively replacing a substantial portion of the lost European market with Chinese demand thediplomat.com<\/a>. Combined with expansions of other routes, Russia\u2019s gas exports to China could exceed 100 bcm per year by the early 2030s<\/em> thediplomat.com<\/a>. For perspective, China imported about 160 bcm of natural gas (LNG + pipeline) in 2023 thediplomat.com<\/a>, so Russia is positioning to become China\u2019s single largest gas supplier in the future thediplomat.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This burgeoning gas partnership is a lifeline for Russia<\/strong> but gives significant leverage to China. With Europe vowing to phase out Russian gas completely by 2027, Moscow urgently needs the Chinese market for its surplus gas thediplomat.com<\/a>thediplomat.com<\/a>. Beijing, knowing Russia has few alternatives, has driven a hard bargain on price. After the 2014 Crimea crisis, when Power of Siberia 1 was negotiated, China secured a long-term price estimated at one-third lower<\/em> (or more) than what European customers were paying Gazprom thediplomat.com<\/a>thediplomat.com<\/a>. A similar dynamic is playing out with Power of Siberia 2: industry analysts expect China to demand steep discounts, given Russia\u2019s weak negotiating hand. Indeed, Gazprom\u2019s CEO Alexei Miller admitted that gas sold to China via the new pipeline will be priced below what was charged to Europe thediplomat.com<\/a>. News of this concession even caused Gazprom\u2019s stock to dip, as investors questioned whether the project would be profitable thediplomat.com<\/a>thediplomat.com<\/a>. In short, China will reap cheap, secure energy<\/strong> while Russia ensures it has a buyer to prevent its gas from becoming \u201cstranded assets.\u201d Moscow publicly touts these Eastward gas projects as a geopolitical triumph \u2013 evidence that it doesn\u2019t need Western markets \u2013 but it is evident that Russia is accepting less lucrative terms out of necessity thediplomat.com<\/a>. Still, both sides see mutual benefit: China gains energy security through pipelines (less dependence on risky seaborne LNG), and Russia gains a long-term customer that can never impose the kind of sanctions Europe did thediplomat.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Beyond oil and pipeline gas, Russia has also become a key supplier of LNG, coal, and electricity<\/strong> to China. In 2022\u20132023, China\u2019s imports of Russian liquefied natural gas<\/strong> hit record levels \u2013 about 8.3 million tons in 2024<\/strong>, making Russia the No.3 LNG supplier to China after Australia and Qatar reuters.com<\/a>reuters.com<\/a>. Russia\u2019s Arctic LNG projects (like Yamal LNG) have redirected cargoes to Asia, and China has invested in some of these projects, tying them closer. Coal<\/strong> is another significant trade: China\u2019s imports of Russian coal have risen (Russia was already a top coal supplier to China), partly because Western sanctions on Russian coal pushed Moscow to sell more to Asia at a discount. In power generation, Russia has begun exporting more electricity<\/strong> to China\u2019s grid from its Far East regions. All these energy links create interdependence: China now relies on Russia for a considerable share of its energy, and Russia relies on Chinese purchases to keep its energy sector solvent. By 2025, roughly 20% of China\u2019s crude oil imports and 15-16% of its pipeline gas<\/strong> could be coming from Russia, and these percentages are poised to grow. Energy cooperation is thus a strong glue binding the two countries, albeit one that clearly tilts in China\u2019s favor when it comes to pricing and terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Financial Collaboration and De-Dollarization Efforts:<\/strong> In parallel with trade, Moscow and Beijing have moved to integrate their financial systems and conduct commerce outside the dollar system<\/strong>. This has been accelerated by Western sanctions on Russia\u2019s banks and the use of the U.S. dollar as what Putin calls a \u201cweapon\u201d theguardian.com<\/a>. Both countries were already unhappy with dollar dominance, and since 2022 they have dramatically expanded the use of national currencies in bilateral trade. Today, the vast majority of Russia-China trade is settled in rubles or yuan rather than dollars<\/strong>. By some accounts, nearly 95%<\/em> of their bilateral trade is now transacted in ruble\/yuan pairs theguardian.com<\/a>theguardian.com<\/a> \u2013 a stunning shift born of sanction-induced necessity. Russian officials proudly report this as a success in Entdollarisierung<\/em>, noting how quickly the yuan has gained prominence in Russia\u2019s economy cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. In early 2022, only about a quarter of Sino-Russian trade was in national currencies; by the end of 2023, roughly one-third of Russia\u2019s total foreign trade was being conducted in Chinese yuan<\/strong> cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. The yuan\u2019s surge was so rapid that by late 2022 Russia became the world\u2019s fourth-largest trading center for RMB (whereas it hadn\u2019t even been in the top 15 earlier that year)cepa.org<\/a>. On the Moscow Currency Exchange, trading volumes in yuan skyrocketed, and the yuan has essentially replaced the dollar as the most traded foreign currency in Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Concretely, this means Russian importers and exporters are increasingly invoicing in yuan or rubles, Russian companies are holding yuan in their reserves, and Chinese firms are happy to avoid dollar exposure when dealing with sanctioned Russian entities. Many Russian banks have integrated with China\u2019s financial infrastructure<\/strong>. After Visa and Mastercard pulled out of Russia, Chinese UnionPay<\/strong> bank cards became a vital alternative for Russians to make international transactionscepa.org<\/a>. At least 11 major Russian banks now issue UnionPay cardscepa.org<\/a>. Russian banks have also joined China\u2019s CIPS<\/strong> (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System) to facilitate yuan transactions as an alternative to SWIFT. Moscow established its own financial messaging system (SPFS), and links between SPFS and China\u2019s systems have been explored to ensure continuity of payments. By 2024, dozens of Russian banks were offering yuan deposits<\/strong> and loans to customers, and Chinese currency became so popular that Russia experienced a yuan liquidity shortage<\/em> in late 2022cepa.org<\/a>. (Interest rates on yuan in Moscow spiked as demand outstripped supply when Russians sought to swap rubles for yuan). This shortage was eventually resolved by early 2025 with measures to increase yuan supplycepa.org<\/a>, but it highlighted Russia\u2019s new dependency on Chinese currency flows. In essence, Russia has partially \u201cyuan-ified\u201d<\/strong> its economy to withstand Western sanctions \u2013 a development very much welcomed by Beijing, as it advances China\u2019s longstanding goal of internationalizing the renminbi cepa.org<\/a>. Russia has effectively become an important test-bed for the yuan as a global currency, as one analysis noted: a significant experimental arena for RMB internationalization cepa.org<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Within BRICS, Entdollarisierung<\/strong> is a common theme pushed by both Moscow and Beijing. They have for years talked about increasing trade in local currencies and even floated the idea of a BRICS reserve currency<\/strong> or a basket currency for trade settlement cfr.org<\/a>cfr.org<\/a>. In 2023\u20132024, this rhetoric intensified, with President Putin publicly calling for an \u201calternative international payments system\u201d at the BRICS summit, arguing that the US dollar\u2019s dominance should be curbed<\/em> to prevent Washington from using it to dictate terms or impose sanctions theguardian.com<\/a>theguardian.com<\/a>. While other BRICS members like Brazil and India are more cautious about any sudden move away from the dollar (given their own ties to the West and fears of instability) theguardian.com<\/a>theguardian.com<\/a>, China and Russia clearly are driving this agenda. They have encouraged the BRICS New Development Bank to lend in local currencies and not just dollars. Notably, Russia began pricing more of its oil sales to China in yuan<\/strong>, and China\u2019s national oil companies have started using RMB to settle oil imports from Russia. Both governments have also increased their gold reserves and made noises about exploring a gold-linked currency for international trade (though that remains speculative at this point).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In terms of institutional financial cooperation<\/strong>, the two countries are coordinating on fronts like sovereign digital currencies (each developing its own CBDC which could eventually be used in cross-border payments) and linking bank card networks (Russia\u2019s Mir card and China\u2019s UnionPay). These efforts dovetail with their push in BRICS to create financial safety nets outside Western control. The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB)<\/em>, headquartered in Shanghai, is one such effort \u2013 co-founded by China and Russia along with the other BRICS members. Both Moscow and Beijing see the NDB as an alternative to the World Bank for emerging economies, and they have encouraged its expansion (Bangladesh, UAE, and others have joined as members). Likewise, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement<\/em> is a mini-IMF pool they support to provide liquidity support in financial crises, so members can potentially rely less on the U.S.-influenced IMF cfr.org<\/a>. In practice these institutions are still limited in size and scope, but China and Russia are likely to continue reinforcing them, especially as Western sanctions and financial pressure persist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Technology and Industrial Collaboration:<\/strong> Another crucial economic aspect is the role of technology and industrial cooperation, which has grown in importance due to sanctions on Russia. China has become Russia\u2019s de facto supplier of critical technology<\/strong> \u2013 from microchips and electronics to machine tools and telecom equipment \u2013 as Western companies have withdrawn. This is not always through state-directed sales; often it\u2019s Chinese companies filling the void or gray-market channels routing goods to Russia. Nevertheless, high-level coordination is evident. Beijing has not joined the Western tech sanctions on Moscow, and trade data show a sharp increase in Chinese exports of semiconductors, electrical machinery, vehicles, and other equipment to Russia since 2022. According to sources close to the Russian government, Chinese technology and components are literally propping up some Russian industries<\/em>: one insider openly acknowledged that without Chinese parts, \u201cwe would not have been able to make a single missile, let alone a drone, and the whole economy would have collapsed long ago\u201d reuters.com<\/a>reuters.com<\/a>. This stark statement illustrates how Chinese dual-use goods (like computer chips, circuit boards, and industrial machines) have become lifelines for Russia\u2019s defense sector and broader economy. Beijing\u2019s willingness to supply these \u2013 albeit often under the radar \u2013 has enabled Russia to keep its military hardware production going despite Western embargoes on advanced technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In strategic sectors like aviation, space, and telecommunications<\/strong>, Russia and China are forging closer ties. They have ongoing joint projects \u2013 for example, co-developing a wide-body passenger jet (CR929) and heavy-lift helicopters \u2013 though these have faced delays. In space, Russia\u2019s Roscosmos and China\u2019s CNSA have agreed to cooperate on a future lunar research station, essentially aligning their space exploration plans as a counter to Western (NASA-led) projects. These collaborations have both symbolic and practical value, signaling a tech partnership that rivals the U.S. and its allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Recognizing the tech synergy and needs, President Putin has explicitly directed his government to deepen high-tech cooperation with China<\/strong>, especially in areas where Russia lags. In late 2024, Putin ordered the Russian government and its largest bank, Sberbank, to \u201censure further cooperation\u201d with China in artificial intelligence (AI)<\/em> research and development reuters.com<\/a>. This directive came shortly after he announced an initiative to form an \u201cAI Alliance Network\u201d bringing together specialists from BRICS countries reuters.com<\/a>. The message is clear: Russia hopes to leverage Chinese strengths in AI to boost its own capabilities, an area where Western sanctions on advanced semiconductors have severely limited Russia. Indeed, Russia\u2019s ability to acquire high-end GPUs (critical for AI) was curtailed when companies like NVIDIA and AMD stopped sales \u2013 Sberbank\u2019s CEO noted that GPUs were the hardest hardware to replace domestically reuters.com<\/a>. By partnering with China, which has its own AI industry and chip development (and which can still obtain or produce certain chips), Russia aims to stay in the race. In turn, China sees value in tapping Russian expertise in areas like mathematics and defense technology for AI applications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another domain of growing cooperation is finance and banking technology<\/strong>: for instance, Chinese firms have provided Russia with the infrastructure for its Mir payment system to work abroad, and there is talk of Russia adopting Chinese experiences in fintech (like digital payments) to modernize its sanctioned financial sector. On energy technology<\/strong>, China has helped Russia with equipment for oil and gas projects (where Western service companies pulled out), and conversely, Russia\u2019s Rosatom is building nuclear reactors in China and sharing nuclear technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It should be noted that China is cautious to avoid secondary sanctions<\/strong>, so it often limits or quietly manages the extent of sensitive tech transfer \u2013 especially any with obvious military use. There have been reports of Chinese firms pausing some exports for fear of U.S. repercussions. But overall, the trend is an accelerating technological interdependence<\/em>: Russia provides some military technologies to China (like early-warning systems for missiles or certain naval tech), and China supplies Russia with crucial dual-use goods and know-how (drones components, electronics, etc.). This complementarity in technology mirrors their economic complementarity, and both countries frame it as part of building \u201ctechnological sovereignty\u201d<\/strong> apart from the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In summary, the economic dimension of the Russia-China BRICS partnership is characterized by robust growth in trade<\/strong>, a deepening energy interlock, and a concerted effort to create a parallel financial ecosystem that reduces reliance on Western currencies and systems. The benefits are evident in hard numbers \u2013 record trade volumes, energy deals, and an increasing share of trade in yuan\/ruble \u2013 but so are the dependencies. China has the upper hand economically (as an indispensable market and source of goods), and Russia\u2019s reliance on Beijing has markedly increased since 2022 cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. Both sides, however, derive strategic advantages<\/em> from this: Russia\u2019s economy has withstood sanctions in large part thanks to China, and China gains a steady resource supply and an ally in reshaping global economic rules. Going forward, we can expect Russia and China to continue institutionalizing these economic ties \u2013 through mechanisms like currency swap lines, integrated payment systems, joint industrial projects, and coordination within BRICS on trade and investment policies. Economic cooperation is the bedrock<\/strong> that makes their political alignment feasible and is thus a priority for both governments to nurture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n United Front in BRICS and Beyond:<\/strong> Diplomatically, Russia and China coordinate closely within BRICS and in other multilateral forums, reinforcing each other\u2019s positions and presenting a common front on many global issues. Both nations champion BRICS as an alternative diplomatic pole<\/strong> in international relations \u2013 often positioning it as the voice of the \u201cGlobal South\u201d or \u201cmajor emerging countries\u201d in contrast to Western-led institutions cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. At BRICS summits and ministerial meetings, Beijing and Moscow typically align their messages. For example, they have jointly advocated for a more inclusive UN system and reform of global governance to better represent developing nations mfa.gov.cn<\/a>cfr.org<\/a>. A core theme they push is \u201cmultipolarity\u201d<\/strong> \u2013 the idea that no single power (read: the U.S.) should dominate world affairs, and that blocs like BRICS can help diversify global leadership cepa.org<\/a>. In their public diplomacy, both countries frequently emphasize principles like respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and the rule of international law (often implying that Western powers violate these principles). This was clearly reflected in BRICS joint statements in recent years: all members, led by China and Russia, repeatedly underscored adherence to the UN Charter and sovereign equality of states cepa.org<\/a>. Such language served to implicitly criticize Western sanctions and interventions without naming names, and to justify the BRICS stance on contentious issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A notable case is how Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine<\/strong> has been handled within BRICS. China and Russia worked together to ensure BRICS would not fracture over the issue. Despite pressure from Western countries for BRICS members to condemn Russia, the BRICS declarations from 2022 (Beijing summit), 2023 (Johannesburg), and 2024 (Kazan) all remained neutral \u2013 they simply noted that members recall their national positions taken at the UN, and they emphasized dialogue and peace, but no direct mention of Russia\u2019s aggression or any blame<\/strong> cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. This outcome was a diplomatic relief for Moscow<\/strong>: it showed that key rising powers were not joining Western condemnation cepa.org<\/a>. In private, Russia has certainly appreciated China\u2019s role in achieving this balanced wording. Beijing could have joined the global majority in criticizing the invasion (as even some of China\u2019s friends found the war problematic), but instead China abstained on UN votes and shielded Russia from isolation in multilateral arenas<\/strong> cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. At the UN Security Council, for instance, China did not support resolutions against Russia\u2019s annexations or its conduct in Ukraine \u2013 usually abstaining, which effectively helped Russia by not adding to the \u201cyes\u201d votes cepa.org<\/a>. Similarly, in the UN General Assembly, China consistently abstained on resolutions deploring Russia\u2019s actions, rather than voting with the West cepa.org<\/a>. This tacit support (or at least non-opposition<\/em>) from the world\u2019s second-largest power was crucial for Russia\u2019s narrative that it was not isolated globally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Conversely, Russia returns the favor by backing China on issues sensitive to Beijing. In the UNSC and other bodies, Moscow reliably supports China\u2019s positions on matters like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang<\/strong>, or the South China Sea. For instance, when Western nations brought up human rights issues in Xinjiang or Hong Kong in forums like the UN Human Rights Council, Russia spoke in China\u2019s defense and joined statements praising China\u2019s development policies in those regions. Both have also vetoed or opposed UNSC resolutions that they see as infringing on sovereignty \u2013 be it in Syria (protecting the Assad regime) or proposals they view as \u201chumanitarian intervention\u201d that could set precedents for outside interference. This symmetry in diplomatic backing<\/strong> is a hallmark of their alignment. It\u2019s rooted in shared ideological leanings: both governments are deeply averse to what they view as Western-promoted regime change or \u201ccolor revolutions,\u201d and they frequently coordinate to block Western initiatives under the banner of defending state sovereignty cepa.org<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Within BRICS, China and Russia often coordinate their policy proposals and jointly launch initiatives. A recent example is how they navigated climate and development policies<\/strong> in BRICS. While climate change could be a divisive issue (given different priorities of members), Beijing and Moscow found common ground in opposing<\/em> what they dub Western \u201cgreen barriers.\u201d In 2024, Russia took the initiative to have BRICS collectively denounce the EU\u2019s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (a tax on carbon-intensive imports) as a protectionist, discriminatory measure cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. China, itself unhappy with such measures, supported Russia\u2019s move. Together they steered BRICS to adopt a BRICS Carbon Market Partnership<\/strong> and set up a climate\/sustainable development contact group \u2013 essentially aligning the bloc against Western climate trade rules while still pledging cooperation on climate goals in principle cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. This episode shows their diplomatic coordination: Russia wanted to rally BRICS against a policy hurting its interests (as a major fossil fuel exporter), and China went along because it too prefers development space<\/em> over stringent foreign environmental regulations. In broader multilateral forums (like the G20 or WTO), China and Russia also often vote or argue in tandem on issues like opposing protectionism, calling for \u201cdemocratization of international relations,\u201d<\/strong> and criticizing sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another area of multilateral coordination is in forming new groupings or cooperating through regional organizations. Both countries are founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)<\/strong> \u2013 a Eurasian bloc that includes Central Asian states and, recently, India and Pakistan (with Iran joining). In forums like the SCO, their cooperation is evident in the security realm (joint military drills, counter-terrorism) and in promoting an alternative narrative of regional order. In September 2025, China hosted the SCO summit in Tianjin, with Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and India\u2019s Narendra Modi prominently joining hands in a show of solidarity reuters.com<\/a>reuters.com<\/a>. At that summit, Putin praised the SCO for exemplifying \u201cgenuine multilateralism\u201d and noted approvingly that national currencies were increasingly used in mutual settlements \u2013 a direct nod to the de-dollarization drive reuters.com<\/a>reuters.com<\/a>. Xi, for his part, used the SCO platform to push what he called a Global Governance Initiative<\/strong>, essentially urging the creation of a new world order where non-Western countries have more sway reuters.com<\/a>. He even proposed setting up an SCO development bank and invited SCO members to participate in China\u2019s lunar space station project and a new AI cooperation center reuters.com<\/a>. All of these ideas align closely with Sino-Russian aims: building parallel institutions (a new bank to reduce reliance on Western finance, joint high-tech and space endeavors to rival Western-led projects). Moscow strongly supports these moves, as they amplify the ecosystem of non-Western cooperation in which Russia can be an important player. Notably, at that SCO summit, Modi and Xi met and talked of being \u201cdevelopment partners, not rivals,\u201d<\/strong> which was a significant easing of China-India tensions (likely encouraged by both Moscow and Beijing behind the scenes) reuters.com<\/a>. Russia was undoubtedly pleased to see its two big Asian partners engage positively, as it reduces a point of friction within the blocs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the high degree of coordination, Russia and China\u2019s foreign policy alignment is not absolute<\/strong> \u2013 they have their own priorities and occasionally divergent views. One such divergence is on the issue of UN Security Council reform<\/strong>. Both Russia and China are permanent members of the UNSC and benefit from the status quo (each wields a veto). Other BRICS members, notably India and Brazil, aspire to permanent UNSC seats. Officially, BRICS statements (shaped by China and Russia) support a greater role for India, Brazil, and South Africa in the UN \u2013 but in practice, Beijing in particular has been lukewarm on any reform that would give India a seat at the table cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. This has led to some public friction: India has implicitly criticized \u201ca non-Western power\u201d (widely understood to mean China) for blocking UNSC expansion and shielding its ally Pakistan from international scrutiny cepa.org<\/a>. Russia\u2019s position on UNSC reform is a bit more flexible \u2013 Moscow has at times said it would back India for a permanent seat \u2013 but it closely coordinates with China on this, and no progress has been made in part because neither wants to dilute their privileged status. Thus, within BRICS forums, the unsaid reality<\/strong> is that China and Russia have slowed the momentum on UN reform, despite other members\u2019 desires cepa.org<\/a>. This is an example where their alignment with each other (preserving P5 power) overrides alignment with BRICS partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another subtle difference lies in their regional diplomatic approaches<\/strong>. In regions like the Middle East or Africa, China and Russia often end up supporting the same governments but for somewhat different reasons. In Africa, for instance, Russia\u2019s engagement has been largely through security assistance, political support for sovereign governments (even military juntas), and mercenary deployments (like Wagner Group) to expand influence and gain resources. China\u2019s approach in Africa is more economics-first: heavy investment in infrastructure, loans, and trade, along with participation in UN peacekeeping. Both say they respect African countries\u2019 sovereignty and offer an alternative to Western conditional aid, but Russia\u2019s goals are \u201cnarrowly protectionist of national governments\u201d<\/strong> (ensuring regime survival and opposing Western intervention) whereas China\u2019s policies reflect its global ambitions like cultivating markets and being seen as Africa\u2019s development partner cepa.org<\/a>. This means that in diplomatic terms, China often engages more with international institutions in those regions<\/strong> (like supporting UN missions or African Union initiatives) while Russia bypasses them in favor of bilateral influence. These differing styles haven\u2019t led to open conflict between Beijing and Moscow, but they could produce different priorities<\/strong>. For example, on an issue like a conflict in Africa, China might emphasize mediation and economic stabilization, whereas Russia might simply back the incumbent power against \u201cWestern meddling.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n That said, both countries find common cause in opposing Western criticism of their partners. In the UN, when resolutions come up on issues like Syria or Venezuela, China and Russia virtually always align their votes (usually vetoing or voting against Western-sponsored resolutions critical of those governments). Their foreign policy alignment<\/strong> is perhaps most solid when it comes to resisting Western democratic norms and human rights pressures. They regularly issue joint statements upholding each other\u2019s governance models \u2013 for instance, in the landmark February 4, 2022 joint statement<\/strong> (issued when Putin visited Xi at the Beijing Olympics), China explicitly backed Russia\u2019s opposition to NATO expansion and Russia affirmed its support for the one-China principle and opposition to any form of Taiwanese independence cepa.org<\/a>. That joint statement declared their partnership had \u201cno limits\u201d and that there were \u201cno forbidden areas\u201d of cooperation cepa.org<\/a>. While reality has imposed some limits since (especially regarding direct military support), the document signaled how closely their worldviews were aligned on major geopolitical questions on the eve of the Ukraine war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Military and Security Coordination<\/strong> deserves a brief mention as part of their diplomatic alignment. Though not a formal military alliance, China and Russia have ramped up joint military exercises and security cooperation, which carry diplomatic messaging. They conduct regular joint drills<\/strong> \u2013 naval patrols in the Pacific, exercises in East Asia (even as far as joint naval drills near Alaska in 2023\u20132024), and large multilateral war games under the SCO framework. These activities are coordinated to show solidarity and present a deterrent image to the West and its allies. For example, after 2022, China participated in Russian strategic exercises (Vostok, etc.) even as NATO accused Russia of aggression, telegraphing that Beijing was not going to isolate Moscow. Diplomatically, both also coordinate positions on arms control issues: they have shared stances on opposing the U.S. deployment of missile defenses, and both declined to join certain Western-led security pacts or statements (like criticizing North Korea too harshly).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In summary, on the diplomatic front, Russia and China act as close partners on the world stage<\/strong>, especially in any forum or issue area where they can push back against U.S. or Western influence. In BRICS, they have steered the group\u2019s agenda towards systemic challenges to the Western-led order (calling for financial reform, dollar alternatives, more say for developing countries) cfr.org<\/a>cfr.org<\/a>. In the UN, they often vote as a bloc and use their veto power in a complementary fashion. In newer groupings like the BRICS-Plus format, SCO, or even informal alignments, they appear side by side promoting \u201ctrue multilateralism\u201d<\/strong> (a phrase they use to suggest a multilateralism not dominated by the West) mfa.gov.cn<\/a>. All this illustrates a high degree of foreign policy alignment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, they also maintain a degree of independence<\/strong> in diplomacy \u2013 neither is entirely subordinate to the other\u2019s agenda. Beijing, for instance, has its own complex relations with the EU, U.S., and regions like Southeast Asia, and it calibrates how overtly it aligns with Russia depending on the audience. It has, at times, put a bit of distance \u2013 for example, Chinese officials have denied knowing about Russia\u2019s war plans in advance and have presented China as a potential peacemaker in Ukraine, at least in rhetoric, to keep Europe from seeing China as an outright adversary. Similarly, Russia has relationships China doesn\u2019t fully share \u2013 notably with India and Vietnam, as discussed later \u2013 and in those instances Moscow doesn\u2019t toe Beijing\u2019s line but tries to balance. This indicates that their alignment has limits<\/strong> and is pragmatic: they coordinate where their interests align (which is a growing list of areas), and tactfully disagree or compartmentalize issues where they don\u2019t. In effect, they have each other\u2019s back<\/em> on core strategic issues (regime security, opposition to Western \u201cinterference\u201d), but they are not bound to march in lockstep on every regional question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Looking ahead, their diplomatic coordination is likely to intensify in any areas involving global governance rules \u2013 such as internet governance, AI norms, space governance \u2013 where both will want to present alternatives to Western standards. Already, within BRICS and SCO they have set up working groups for things like digital sovereignty<\/strong> und information security<\/strong>, clearly aiming to shape global norms in those arenas jointly. As U.S.-China rivalry and Russia-West confrontation continue, the incentives for Beijing and Moscow to speak with one voice<\/strong> in international forums will remain strong. The challenge for them will be managing the divergent interests of other partners (India, etc.) and not pushing too hard an overt anti-West bloc image that could alienate neutral countries. But to date, they have shown skill in balancing: BRICS, for instance, issues bland statements on contentious political issues (as noted, neutrality on Ukraine) while focusing on positive agendas like development banks or vaccine cooperation \u2013 areas where consensus is easier. This reflects conscious Chinese and Russian diplomatic coordination<\/strong> to keep these coalitions broad and attractive, rather than narrowly antagonistic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In summary, Russia-China diplomatic alignment<\/strong> within BRICS and multilateral fora can be characterized as a synchronized effort to reshape the international order<\/em> to their liking, stopping short of a formal alliance that would constrain their freedom of action. They provide mutual diplomatic cover (China protecting Russia at the UN, Russia firmly endorsing China\u2019s core interests), co-create initiatives under BRICS\/SCO (from financial mechanisms to joint statements on global issues), and reinforce each other\u2019s narratives about a changing world order where the West\u2019s unipolar moment is fading cepa.org<\/a>blog.bti-project.org<\/a>. This coordination greatly amplifies each country\u2019s global influence: together, a China-Russia bloc carries more weight in negotiations and votes than either alone. It also sends a powerful signal to other nations \u2013 particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America \u2013 that an alternative leadership axis exists, one that might better represent their interests or at least give them leverage with the West. For both Putin and Xi, this is a key strategic outcome of their partnership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While the Russia-China partnership within BRICS is strong, it is not without intrinsic frictions and limitations<\/strong>. Beneath the displays of solidarity lie differences in power, interests, and perspectives that could, if unmanaged, hinder the depth of their cooperation. Here we examine several potential points of tension:<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1. Asymmetry \u2013 The Junior Partner Problem:<\/strong> A fundamental issue is the growing power imbalance. China\u2019s economy and global clout have surged over the past two decades, far outpacing Russia\u2019s. By some measures, China\u2019s GDP is now roughly 8\u20139 times larger<\/em> than Russia\u2019s reuters.com<\/a>. This translates into Beijing being the dominant economic partner \u2013 a reality acknowledged even in Moscow reuters.com<\/a>. Russia\u2019s dependency on China has sharply increased<\/strong> since 2022, leading some in Russia to worry about becoming overly beholden to Chinese interests cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. This dynamic can breed resentment or at least unease on the Russian side. Russian commentators sometimes warn against the country turning into a raw-material appendage to China\u2019s economy, where Russia exports only oil, gas, and wood, and imports everything else. The data support the concern: as noted, in 2024 China comprised ~36% of Russia\u2019s total trade, while Russia was only ~5% of China\u2019s trade fpri.org<\/a>. Trade imbalances<\/strong> mean vast Russian trade surpluses with China (Russia sells more to China than it buys in value terms, due to energy exports), but that surplus doesn\u2019t translate to leverage because Russia often needs China to buy those surplus commodities more than China needs any particular Russian product (China can source similar commodities globally).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, China holds the upper hand in negotiations<\/strong>, as seen in the energy sector. The protracted haggling over gas prices (with China extracting heavy discounts) is a prime example thediplomat.com<\/a>thediplomat.com<\/a>. There is a pattern: when Russia finds itself isolated or in urgent need (as after 2014, and again after 2022), China capitalizes on that to secure beneficial terms. Another case was in 2008\u20132009 when Rosneft and Transneft were desperate for loans during the financial crisis; China gave a $25 billion loan for pipeline construction but only in exchange for 20 years of oil at a locked-in low price and a pipeline branch directly into China cepa.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. In effect, Russia often has to accept a \u201cprice of partnership\u201d<\/strong> on Chinese terms. This can cause friction among Russian business and political elites who feel they are getting the short end of deals. For example, after the recent Power of Siberia 2 memorandum, analysts in Russia openly debated whether the project made financial sense given China\u2019s likely low price demands, and Gazprom\u2019s stock dip showed investor skepticism thediplomat.com<\/a>thediplomat.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia\u2019s role as primarily an exporter of commodities and importer of finished Chinese goods also hits a nerve domestically. It underlines Russia\u2019s lack of diversification and technological lag<\/strong>. Outside of the defense and nuclear sectors, Russia is not seen as a leading producer of advanced products in the partnership. This has fueled an internal narrative in Russia calling for protecting domestic industries from being swamped by Chinese imports. Indeed, Russia has at times dragged its feet or set limits in economic initiatives that might favor China too much. A telling example: integrating the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)<\/strong> (a Russia-led customs union) with China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative has made only halting progress. While Putin and Xi announced a vision of \u201clinking\u201d the EEU and BRI in 2015, in reality Russia has been wary \u2013 likely because EEU members (like Kazakhstan) trade far more with China and could be economically dominated by China\u2019s giant economy if barriers are removed. Russia notably has not<\/em> signed an EEU-wide free trade agreement with China, even though it did so with smaller economies like Vietnam, and even started talks with others in Asia fpri.org<\/a>. This reticence suggests Russia fears a flood of cheap Chinese goods undermining its industries and becoming too dependent on Chinese supply chains fpri.org<\/a>. From China\u2019s perspective, such reluctance is frustrating \u2013 Beijing has openly encouraged more \u201cwin-win\u201d trade openness, but runs into Russian protectionism<\/strong> at times. These economic frictions underline that the two countries\u2019 interests are not perfectly aligned: China wants greater market access and investment opportunities in Russia (especially in mining, energy, and infrastructure), whereas Russia, though needing Chinese capital, is cautious about losing economic sovereignty<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. Regional Rivalries and Third-Party Relationships:<\/strong> Russia and China each have other strategic partners and regional interests that don\u2019t always mesh. A prominent example is India<\/strong>. India is a member of BRICS (and the SCO), so it sits in the same forums that China and Russia dominate. However, India is also a historical ally of Russia<\/strong> and simultaneously a strategic rival of China<\/strong>. This triangular dynamic is complicated. Russia has valued its relationship with India for decades \u2013 India is a top buyer of Russian arms and has been a diplomatic friend to Moscow (it maintained neutrality on the Ukraine war, for instance, refusing to join sanctions on Russia). China, on the other hand, has border disputes and a history of war (1962) with India, and today they jostle for influence in Asia. Within BRICS, India often takes a different line<\/strong>: for example, India has been reluctant to endorse some anti-Western statements and is wary of BRICS becoming too China-centric cfr.org<\/a>. During the 2023 BRICS expansion debate, India (along with Brazil) was cautious about accepting a flood of new members favored by China, fearing BRICS might turn into a China-led club with an anti-West tilt cfr.org<\/a>cepa.org<\/a>. Modi\u2019s government wanted to preserve BRICS as a platform that also serves India\u2019s interests (which include maintaining good ties with the US). Eventually India acquiesced to expansion, but this showed a crack: India\u2019s rivalry with China can inject tension<\/strong> that Russia has to manage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia essentially tries to play the peacemaker or balancer<\/strong> between China and India. The Kremlin enjoys good relations with both New Delhi and Beijing, and it has taken a stance of neutrality on their disputes. For instance, when deadly skirmishes erupted between Indian and Chinese troops in the Himalayas in 2020, Russia remained neutral and continued business-as-usual with both (even hosting meetings where Indian and Chinese ministers met on the sidelines to talk) fpri.org<\/a>fpri.org<\/a>. Russia also has continued supplying advanced weapons to India (like the S-400 air defense systems, delivered even as recently as 2022-2023) fpri.org<\/a>fpri.org<\/a>, which does not sit well with Beijing. China would prefer Russia not strengthen the military of a country it sees as a potential adversary. On the flip side, India\u2019s closer defense ties with the U.S. in recent years (partly a response to China) are something Russia views with some alarm, but it hasn\u2019t altered Russia\u2019s commitment to its India partnership. So far, Russia has managed a delicate diplomatic tightrope<\/strong>: it affirms strong ties with India (calling it a \u201ctrusted friend\u201d), while simultaneously declaring its \u201cbest friendship\u201d with China. Both Beijing and New Delhi accept this for now \u2013 China perhaps tolerating Russia-India ties because they predate the Sino-Russian rapprochement, and India understanding Russia will not cut off China. But this balancing act could become harder if India-China relations worsen (e.g., another border war). In a scenario where India might expect Russia to support it or China expects Russia to side with Beijing, Moscow could be put in an uncomfortable spot. Such an event would test the Russia-China partnership: how far would Russia go in backing China if it meant alienating India (and losing a big arms market and ally)? The likely answer is Russia would attempt to stay neutral, which might irritate Beijing. This is a latent friction<\/strong> point \u2013 currently mitigated, but potentially disruptive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another regional area is Economic Cooperation: Trade, Energy, and Financial Integration<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Diplomatic Coordination in Multilateral Forums and Foreign Policy Alignment<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Potential Friction Points and Limitations in Cooperation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n