Future of Russian-Chinese Relations within BRICS

An Economic and Diplomatic Outlook

Russia and China have both embraced BRICS as a platform to advance a more multipolar world order and to amplify the voice of emerging powers in global affairs. They often portray BRICS as an alternative to Western-led groupings like the G7, emphasizing sovereign equality and development for the Global South cepa.org. For Moscow, BRICS serves as a vehicle to counterbalance Western dominance and rehabilitate Russia’s international image after its isolation by the West – especially following widespread condemnation of the Ukraine war cepa.org. President Vladimir Putin has explicitly cast BRICS as “a pillar of the multipolar world” and a milestone in the fight against U.S. hegemony blog.bti-project.org. Beijing shares the goal of challenging U.S.-centric structures, viewing BRICS as a complementary venue to its own initiatives (such as the Belt and Road) for reshaping global governance carnegieendowment.orgblog.bti-project.org. Chinese officials highlight that the China-Russia partnership “moves ahead along the trend of the times toward multipolarity and greater democracy in international relations” – a new paradigm distinct from Cold War-era blocs mfa.gov.cn. Both powers thus see BRICS as a means to reform the international system to give non-Western countries greater influence.

Yet, within this general alignment, Russia’s and China’s strategic aims diverge in nuance and priority. Beijing’s vision tends to be broader and more future-oriented: China uses BRICS to supplement its global leadership aspirations, promote a development-centric agenda, and build networks in the Global Southcepa.org. Moscow’s approach is more defensive and immediate: Russia leans on BRICS to validate its great-power status and break out of geopolitical isolation cepa.orgcepa.org. For example, Russia has tried to frame BRICS as sympathetic to its narratives and an implicit counterweight to the West, to show it still has powerful friends cepa.org. China, which doesn’t share Moscow’s need for diplomatic “rehabilitation,” has been willing to accommodate Russia’s rhetoric up to a point – occasionally softening or recalibrating the tone to maintain the group’s balance cepa.org. This dynamic was evident in BRICS statements on the Ukraine conflict: the joint declarations simply “recall our national positions” and affirm principles of the UN Charter, without condemning or endorsing Russia’s actions cepa.org. Such carefully neutral language (reiterating respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity) was a diplomatic compromise that avoided isolating Russia while not forcing China (or others) to explicitly defend Moscow’s war cepa.org. In effect, China and Russia coordinated to keep BRICS unified and focused on less divisive issues, rather than let the Ukraine issue split the bloc.

Importantly, both countries stress that their partnership – even as it drives coordination in BRICS – is not a formal alliance. They often describe it as a “comprehensive strategic partnership” or even a “friendship with no limits,” but it deliberately lacks treaty obligations cepa.orgcepa.org. This non-alliance stance is by design: it preserves flexibility for each side. Beijing and Moscow prize strategic autonomy and have a history of shifting relationships, so they avoid binding military alliances. The result is a cooperative but interest-driven alignment. As one analysis put it, their political alignment is best seen as a friendship rather than a classical alliance, with each free to take independent actions and even diverge at times cepa.org. This approach creates strategic ambiguity for outsiders and maneuvering room for China and Russia themselves cepa.org. For instance, Russia can test certain international norms or float initiatives (such as proposals in the UN or new BRICS programs) and China can choose whether to endorse or distance itself from those moves cepa.org. Both see benefit in this arrangement: China gains a partner that challenges Western hegemony on multiple fronts, and Russia retains enough independence to not appear a subservient junior ally.

In summary, strategically within BRICS both nations are aligned in challenging the Western-dominated status quo and championing multipolarity, but they calibrate their efforts differently. China’s goals within BRICS include bolstering its image as leader of the Global South and expanding its economic reach, while Russia’s goals center on demonstrating it is not isolated and that it remains a key global player. These goals largely complement each other despite some differences in emphasis. Going forward, we can expect Beijing and Moscow to continue leveraging BRICS to push for reforms in global governance (e.g. advocating UN Security Council changes, or new financial mechanisms) and to jointly present an ideological alternative to Western “bloc” politics mfa.gov.cncepa.org. However, they will likely maintain the loose, non-binding nature of their alignment – a “no limits” partnership in rhetoric that masks very real limits in practice. This allows them to stand united on broad principles while quietly navigating any disagreements behind the scenes.

Economic Cooperation: Trade, Energy, and Financial Integration

Figure: Russia-China trade (in US$ billions) surged to record levels by 2024 but showed signs of leveling off in 2025. The chart illustrates bilateral trade volume from 2019 through 2025 (2025 data through July), highlighting the sharp post-2022 increase and slight dip in early 2025. reuters.comfpri.org

Bilateral Trade Boom and Complementarity: Economic ties between China and Russia have deepened dramatically, especially after 2022, reaching unprecedented levels of trade. In 2022, as Russia pivoted away from Europe due to sanctions, China stepped in as a major buyer of Russian commodities and supplier of goods. This propelled bilateral trade to record highs: about $190 billion in 2022 and then $240–245 billion in 2023–2024, smashing the earlier target of $200 billion which they met ahead of schedule mfa.gov.cnreuters.com. By 2024, Russia-China trade turnover hit roughly $245 billion reuters.com, a milestone that underscores how vital they have become to each other economically. This boom has been fueled by a surge in Russian exports of energy and raw materials to China and a parallel flood of Chinese manufactured products, machinery, and electronics into the Russian market reuters.comfpri.org. In practical terms, Russian oil, gas, coal, metals, and agricultural goods are exchanging for Chinese cars, telecommunications equipment, consumer electronics, and other high value goods. The two economies are often described as naturally complementary: Russia is a vast resource exporter with needs for technology and consumer items, while China is a manufacturing powerhouse hungry for energy – a classic commodity-for-industry exchange cepa.orgcepa.org.

This complementarity, however, comes with a clear imbalance. China’s economy is much larger and more diversified than Russia’s, translating into an unequal trade relationship. China is now by far Russia’s top trading partner – accounting for about 36% of Russia’s total trade – whereas Russia makes up only roughly 5–6% of China’s trade fpri.org. In other words, Russia depends on access to China’s market and imports far more than China depends on Russia’s. Although China is Russia’s largest trading partner, Russia remains a relatively minor slice of China’s global trade portfolio fpri.org. This asymmetry means Moscow needs Beijing economically more than vice versa. The pattern of trade reinforces this: Russia exports mostly raw materials (oil, gas, minerals, timber) and imports mostly finished goods and technology from China fpri.org. Such a structure has benefitted both – Russia found a critical lifeline for sanctioned goods and a source of revenue when European markets closed, while China gained a stable supply of discounted energy and a new market for its companies cepa.orgcepa.org. But it also feeds Russian anxieties about becoming overly dependent on China or relegated to being “China’s gas station.” Russian analysts sometimes warn of the country turning into a “resource appendage” of China, noting that outside of arms and military tech, Russia is contributing little in terms of high-tech or value-added exports fpri.org. This unease has occasionally spurred Russia to push back on economic integration that it feels might be one-sided – for instance, Moscow has been slow to agree to Beijing’s proposals for a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and has guarded certain sectors to protect its industries fpri.org. Despite these frictions (discussed more later), the overall trajectory of trade is upward, and both governments have lauded the “strong resilience and broad prospects” of their economic cooperation mfa.gov.cnmfa.gov.cn. It’s telling that even in 2025, when bilateral trade saw a slight dip (down ~8% year-on-year in the first half, after the previous year’s peak), officials on both sides immediately began seeking ways to boost trade further, targeting sectors like agriculture and new energy projects to rekindle growth reuters.comreuters.com. This indicates a commitment to continue expanding commercial ties in the long run.

Deepening Energy Partnership: Energy trade forms the backbone of the Sino-Russian economic relationship. Since Western sanctions in 2022, China has dramatically increased its intake of Russian oil and gas, becoming Russia’s crucial energy customer. China – the world’s largest oil importer – ignored Western oil sanctions and price caps on Russia, instead taking advantage of discounted prices to ramp up purchases reuters.com. In 2024, Chinese crude oil imports from Russia hit an all-time high: China bought about 108.5 million tons of Russian crude that year (including both seaborne and pipeline supplies), equivalent to roughly 2.17 million barrels per day reuters.com. This was a slight increase (about 1% up) from 2023 and came even as China trimmed imports from other suppliers like Saudi Arabia reuters.com. By this measure, Russia has either matched or surpassed Saudi Arabia as China’s single largest crude supplier. Much of this oil comes via the ESPO pipeline spur into Northeast China and tankers from Russia’s Far East ports, often at prices below global benchmarks – a win-win where Russia secures a huge buyer and China saves on cost. There are reports that Russia even routed more oil through third countries or via “shadow fleet” tankers to reach China and other Asian buyers, underscoring how critical the Chinese market is after Europe largely cut off Russian oil. Moscow has also explored new routes, such as increasing oil transit via Kazakhstan, to send additional volumes to China beyond established pipelines reuters.com.

On natural gas, a major strategic shift is underway. Historically, Russia sent the bulk of its natural gas westward to Europe. After 2014 (Crimea sanctions) and especially 2022, Russia began reorienting gas flows to the east. The Power of Siberia 1 pipeline – a 3,000 km pipeline that came online in 2019 – has rapidly increased deliveries of Siberian gas to China reuters.com. In 2024, Russia supplied roughly 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas through this pipeline, and it’s on track to reach the full contracted volume of 38 bcm per year by 2025 reuters.comreuters.com. While still small compared to Russia’s pre-war gas sales to Europe, this pipeline has created a new artery of long-term energy interdependence (it’s under a 30-year, $400 billion deal). In addition, in early 2022 China agreed to import up to 10 bcm annually from Russia via a planned new Far East pipeline (from Sakhalin island), expected around 2026–27 reuters.com. The most ambitious project is the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which would run from Russia’s huge West Siberian gas fields (the same fields that fed Europe) through Mongolia into China. After years of talks with no breakthrough, Russia announced in September 2025 that Gazprom and China’s CNPC had finally signed a legally binding memorandum on Power of Siberia 2 thediplomat.com. The pipeline, if built, is slated to carry 50 bcm of gas annually – effectively replacing a substantial portion of the lost European market with Chinese demand thediplomat.com. Combined with expansions of other routes, Russia’s gas exports to China could exceed 100 bcm per year by the early 2030s thediplomat.com. For perspective, China imported about 160 bcm of natural gas (LNG + pipeline) in 2023 thediplomat.com, so Russia is positioning to become China’s single largest gas supplier in the future thediplomat.com.

This burgeoning gas partnership is a lifeline for Russia but gives significant leverage to China. With Europe vowing to phase out Russian gas completely by 2027, Moscow urgently needs the Chinese market for its surplus gas thediplomat.comthediplomat.com. Beijing, knowing Russia has few alternatives, has driven a hard bargain on price. After the 2014 Crimea crisis, when Power of Siberia 1 was negotiated, China secured a long-term price estimated at one-third lower (or more) than what European customers were paying Gazprom thediplomat.comthediplomat.com. A similar dynamic is playing out with Power of Siberia 2: industry analysts expect China to demand steep discounts, given Russia’s weak negotiating hand. Indeed, Gazprom’s CEO Alexei Miller admitted that gas sold to China via the new pipeline will be priced below what was charged to Europe thediplomat.com. News of this concession even caused Gazprom’s stock to dip, as investors questioned whether the project would be profitable thediplomat.comthediplomat.com. In short, China will reap cheap, secure energy while Russia ensures it has a buyer to prevent its gas from becoming “stranded assets.” Moscow publicly touts these Eastward gas projects as a geopolitical triumph – evidence that it doesn’t need Western markets – but it is evident that Russia is accepting less lucrative terms out of necessity thediplomat.com. Still, both sides see mutual benefit: China gains energy security through pipelines (less dependence on risky seaborne LNG), and Russia gains a long-term customer that can never impose the kind of sanctions Europe did thediplomat.com.

Beyond oil and pipeline gas, Russia has also become a key supplier of LNG, coal, and electricity to China. In 2022–2023, China’s imports of Russian liquefied natural gas hit record levels – about 8.3 million tons in 2024, making Russia the No.3 LNG supplier to China after Australia and Qatar reuters.comreuters.com. Russia’s Arctic LNG projects (like Yamal LNG) have redirected cargoes to Asia, and China has invested in some of these projects, tying them closer. Coal is another significant trade: China’s imports of Russian coal have risen (Russia was already a top coal supplier to China), partly because Western sanctions on Russian coal pushed Moscow to sell more to Asia at a discount. In power generation, Russia has begun exporting more electricity to China’s grid from its Far East regions. All these energy links create interdependence: China now relies on Russia for a considerable share of its energy, and Russia relies on Chinese purchases to keep its energy sector solvent. By 2025, roughly 20% of China’s crude oil imports and 15-16% of its pipeline gas could be coming from Russia, and these percentages are poised to grow. Energy cooperation is thus a strong glue binding the two countries, albeit one that clearly tilts in China’s favor when it comes to pricing and terms.

Financial Collaboration and De-Dollarization Efforts: In parallel with trade, Moscow and Beijing have moved to integrate their financial systems and conduct commerce outside the dollar system. This has been accelerated by Western sanctions on Russia’s banks and the use of the U.S. dollar as what Putin calls a “weapon” theguardian.com. Both countries were already unhappy with dollar dominance, and since 2022 they have dramatically expanded the use of national currencies in bilateral trade. Today, the vast majority of Russia-China trade is settled in rubles or yuan rather than dollars. By some accounts, nearly 95% of their bilateral trade is now transacted in ruble/yuan pairs theguardian.comtheguardian.com – a stunning shift born of sanction-induced necessity. Russian officials proudly report this as a success in Entdollarisierung, noting how quickly the yuan has gained prominence in Russia’s economy cepa.orgcepa.org. In early 2022, only about a quarter of Sino-Russian trade was in national currencies; by the end of 2023, roughly one-third of Russia’s total foreign trade was being conducted in Chinese yuan cepa.orgcepa.org. The yuan’s surge was so rapid that by late 2022 Russia became the world’s fourth-largest trading center for RMB (whereas it hadn’t even been in the top 15 earlier that year)cepa.org. On the Moscow Currency Exchange, trading volumes in yuan skyrocketed, and the yuan has essentially replaced the dollar as the most traded foreign currency in Russia.

Concretely, this means Russian importers and exporters are increasingly invoicing in yuan or rubles, Russian companies are holding yuan in their reserves, and Chinese firms are happy to avoid dollar exposure when dealing with sanctioned Russian entities. Many Russian banks have integrated with China’s financial infrastructure. After Visa and Mastercard pulled out of Russia, Chinese UnionPay bank cards became a vital alternative for Russians to make international transactionscepa.org. At least 11 major Russian banks now issue UnionPay cardscepa.org. Russian banks have also joined China’s CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System) to facilitate yuan transactions as an alternative to SWIFT. Moscow established its own financial messaging system (SPFS), and links between SPFS and China’s systems have been explored to ensure continuity of payments. By 2024, dozens of Russian banks were offering yuan deposits and loans to customers, and Chinese currency became so popular that Russia experienced a yuan liquidity shortage in late 2022cepa.org. (Interest rates on yuan in Moscow spiked as demand outstripped supply when Russians sought to swap rubles for yuan). This shortage was eventually resolved by early 2025 with measures to increase yuan supplycepa.org, but it highlighted Russia’s new dependency on Chinese currency flows. In essence, Russia has partially “yuan-ified” its economy to withstand Western sanctions – a development very much welcomed by Beijing, as it advances China’s longstanding goal of internationalizing the renminbi cepa.org. Russia has effectively become an important test-bed for the yuan as a global currency, as one analysis noted: a significant experimental arena for RMB internationalization cepa.org.

Within BRICS, Entdollarisierung is a common theme pushed by both Moscow and Beijing. They have for years talked about increasing trade in local currencies and even floated the idea of a BRICS reserve currency or a basket currency for trade settlement cfr.orgcfr.org. In 2023–2024, this rhetoric intensified, with President Putin publicly calling for an “alternative international payments system” at the BRICS summit, arguing that the US dollar’s dominance should be curbed to prevent Washington from using it to dictate terms or impose sanctions theguardian.comtheguardian.com. While other BRICS members like Brazil and India are more cautious about any sudden move away from the dollar (given their own ties to the West and fears of instability) theguardian.comtheguardian.com, China and Russia clearly are driving this agenda. They have encouraged the BRICS New Development Bank to lend in local currencies and not just dollars. Notably, Russia began pricing more of its oil sales to China in yuan, and China’s national oil companies have started using RMB to settle oil imports from Russia. Both governments have also increased their gold reserves and made noises about exploring a gold-linked currency for international trade (though that remains speculative at this point).

In terms of institutional financial cooperation, the two countries are coordinating on fronts like sovereign digital currencies (each developing its own CBDC which could eventually be used in cross-border payments) and linking bank card networks (Russia’s Mir card and China’s UnionPay). These efforts dovetail with their push in BRICS to create financial safety nets outside Western control. The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), headquartered in Shanghai, is one such effort – co-founded by China and Russia along with the other BRICS members. Both Moscow and Beijing see the NDB as an alternative to the World Bank for emerging economies, and they have encouraged its expansion (Bangladesh, UAE, and others have joined as members). Likewise, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement is a mini-IMF pool they support to provide liquidity support in financial crises, so members can potentially rely less on the U.S.-influenced IMF cfr.org. In practice these institutions are still limited in size and scope, but China and Russia are likely to continue reinforcing them, especially as Western sanctions and financial pressure persist.

Technology and Industrial Collaboration: Another crucial economic aspect is the role of technology and industrial cooperation, which has grown in importance due to sanctions on Russia. China has become Russia’s de facto supplier of critical technology – from microchips and electronics to machine tools and telecom equipment – as Western companies have withdrawn. This is not always through state-directed sales; often it’s Chinese companies filling the void or gray-market channels routing goods to Russia. Nevertheless, high-level coordination is evident. Beijing has not joined the Western tech sanctions on Moscow, and trade data show a sharp increase in Chinese exports of semiconductors, electrical machinery, vehicles, and other equipment to Russia since 2022. According to sources close to the Russian government, Chinese technology and components are literally propping up some Russian industries: one insider openly acknowledged that without Chinese parts, “we would not have been able to make a single missile, let alone a drone, and the whole economy would have collapsed long ago” reuters.comreuters.com. This stark statement illustrates how Chinese dual-use goods (like computer chips, circuit boards, and industrial machines) have become lifelines for Russia’s defense sector and broader economy. Beijing’s willingness to supply these – albeit often under the radar – has enabled Russia to keep its military hardware production going despite Western embargoes on advanced technology.

In strategic sectors like aviation, space, and telecommunications, Russia and China are forging closer ties. They have ongoing joint projects – for example, co-developing a wide-body passenger jet (CR929) and heavy-lift helicopters – though these have faced delays. In space, Russia’s Roscosmos and China’s CNSA have agreed to cooperate on a future lunar research station, essentially aligning their space exploration plans as a counter to Western (NASA-led) projects. These collaborations have both symbolic and practical value, signaling a tech partnership that rivals the U.S. and its allies.

Recognizing the tech synergy and needs, President Putin has explicitly directed his government to deepen high-tech cooperation with China, especially in areas where Russia lags. In late 2024, Putin ordered the Russian government and its largest bank, Sberbank, to “ensure further cooperation” with China in artificial intelligence (AI) research and development reuters.com. This directive came shortly after he announced an initiative to form an “AI Alliance Network” bringing together specialists from BRICS countries reuters.com. The message is clear: Russia hopes to leverage Chinese strengths in AI to boost its own capabilities, an area where Western sanctions on advanced semiconductors have severely limited Russia. Indeed, Russia’s ability to acquire high-end GPUs (critical for AI) was curtailed when companies like NVIDIA and AMD stopped sales – Sberbank’s CEO noted that GPUs were the hardest hardware to replace domestically reuters.com. By partnering with China, which has its own AI industry and chip development (and which can still obtain or produce certain chips), Russia aims to stay in the race. In turn, China sees value in tapping Russian expertise in areas like mathematics and defense technology for AI applications.

Another domain of growing cooperation is finance and banking technology: for instance, Chinese firms have provided Russia with the infrastructure for its Mir payment system to work abroad, and there is talk of Russia adopting Chinese experiences in fintech (like digital payments) to modernize its sanctioned financial sector. On energy technology, China has helped Russia with equipment for oil and gas projects (where Western service companies pulled out), and conversely, Russia’s Rosatom is building nuclear reactors in China and sharing nuclear technology.

It should be noted that China is cautious to avoid secondary sanctions, so it often limits or quietly manages the extent of sensitive tech transfer – especially any with obvious military use. There have been reports of Chinese firms pausing some exports for fear of U.S. repercussions. But overall, the trend is an accelerating technological interdependence: Russia provides some military technologies to China (like early-warning systems for missiles or certain naval tech), and China supplies Russia with crucial dual-use goods and know-how (drones components, electronics, etc.). This complementarity in technology mirrors their economic complementarity, and both countries frame it as part of building “technological sovereignty” apart from the West.

In summary, the economic dimension of the Russia-China BRICS partnership is characterized by robust growth in trade, a deepening energy interlock, and a concerted effort to create a parallel financial ecosystem that reduces reliance on Western currencies and systems. The benefits are evident in hard numbers – record trade volumes, energy deals, and an increasing share of trade in yuan/ruble – but so are the dependencies. China has the upper hand economically (as an indispensable market and source of goods), and Russia’s reliance on Beijing has markedly increased since 2022 cepa.orgcepa.org. Both sides, however, derive strategic advantages from this: Russia’s economy has withstood sanctions in large part thanks to China, and China gains a steady resource supply and an ally in reshaping global economic rules. Going forward, we can expect Russia and China to continue institutionalizing these economic ties – through mechanisms like currency swap lines, integrated payment systems, joint industrial projects, and coordination within BRICS on trade and investment policies. Economic cooperation is the bedrock that makes their political alignment feasible and is thus a priority for both governments to nurture.

Diplomatic Coordination in Multilateral Forums and Foreign Policy Alignment

United Front in BRICS and Beyond: Diplomatically, Russia and China coordinate closely within BRICS and in other multilateral forums, reinforcing each other’s positions and presenting a common front on many global issues. Both nations champion BRICS as an alternative diplomatic pole in international relations – often positioning it as the voice of the “Global South” or “major emerging countries” in contrast to Western-led institutions cepa.orgcepa.org. At BRICS summits and ministerial meetings, Beijing and Moscow typically align their messages. For example, they have jointly advocated for a more inclusive UN system and reform of global governance to better represent developing nations mfa.gov.cncfr.org. A core theme they push is “multipolarity” – the idea that no single power (read: the U.S.) should dominate world affairs, and that blocs like BRICS can help diversify global leadership cepa.org. In their public diplomacy, both countries frequently emphasize principles like respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and the rule of international law (often implying that Western powers violate these principles). This was clearly reflected in BRICS joint statements in recent years: all members, led by China and Russia, repeatedly underscored adherence to the UN Charter and sovereign equality of states cepa.org. Such language served to implicitly criticize Western sanctions and interventions without naming names, and to justify the BRICS stance on contentious issues.

A notable case is how Russia’s war in Ukraine has been handled within BRICS. China and Russia worked together to ensure BRICS would not fracture over the issue. Despite pressure from Western countries for BRICS members to condemn Russia, the BRICS declarations from 2022 (Beijing summit), 2023 (Johannesburg), and 2024 (Kazan) all remained neutral – they simply noted that members recall their national positions taken at the UN, and they emphasized dialogue and peace, but no direct mention of Russia’s aggression or any blame cepa.orgcepa.org. This outcome was a diplomatic relief for Moscow: it showed that key rising powers were not joining Western condemnation cepa.org. In private, Russia has certainly appreciated China’s role in achieving this balanced wording. Beijing could have joined the global majority in criticizing the invasion (as even some of China’s friends found the war problematic), but instead China abstained on UN votes and shielded Russia from isolation in multilateral arenas cepa.orgcepa.org. At the UN Security Council, for instance, China did not support resolutions against Russia’s annexations or its conduct in Ukraine – usually abstaining, which effectively helped Russia by not adding to the “yes” votes cepa.org. Similarly, in the UN General Assembly, China consistently abstained on resolutions deploring Russia’s actions, rather than voting with the West cepa.org. This tacit support (or at least non-opposition) from the world’s second-largest power was crucial for Russia’s narrative that it was not isolated globally.

Conversely, Russia returns the favor by backing China on issues sensitive to Beijing. In the UNSC and other bodies, Moscow reliably supports China’s positions on matters like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, or the South China Sea. For instance, when Western nations brought up human rights issues in Xinjiang or Hong Kong in forums like the UN Human Rights Council, Russia spoke in China’s defense and joined statements praising China’s development policies in those regions. Both have also vetoed or opposed UNSC resolutions that they see as infringing on sovereignty – be it in Syria (protecting the Assad regime) or proposals they view as “humanitarian intervention” that could set precedents for outside interference. This symmetry in diplomatic backing is a hallmark of their alignment. It’s rooted in shared ideological leanings: both governments are deeply averse to what they view as Western-promoted regime change or “color revolutions,” and they frequently coordinate to block Western initiatives under the banner of defending state sovereignty cepa.org.

Within BRICS, China and Russia often coordinate their policy proposals and jointly launch initiatives. A recent example is how they navigated climate and development policies in BRICS. While climate change could be a divisive issue (given different priorities of members), Beijing and Moscow found common ground in opposing what they dub Western “green barriers.” In 2024, Russia took the initiative to have BRICS collectively denounce the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (a tax on carbon-intensive imports) as a protectionist, discriminatory measure cepa.orgcepa.org. China, itself unhappy with such measures, supported Russia’s move. Together they steered BRICS to adopt a BRICS Carbon Market Partnership and set up a climate/sustainable development contact group – essentially aligning the bloc against Western climate trade rules while still pledging cooperation on climate goals in principle cepa.orgcepa.org. This episode shows their diplomatic coordination: Russia wanted to rally BRICS against a policy hurting its interests (as a major fossil fuel exporter), and China went along because it too prefers development space over stringent foreign environmental regulations. In broader multilateral forums (like the G20 or WTO), China and Russia also often vote or argue in tandem on issues like opposing protectionism, calling for “democratization of international relations,” and criticizing sanctions.

Another area of multilateral coordination is in forming new groupings or cooperating through regional organizations. Both countries are founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – a Eurasian bloc that includes Central Asian states and, recently, India and Pakistan (with Iran joining). In forums like the SCO, their cooperation is evident in the security realm (joint military drills, counter-terrorism) and in promoting an alternative narrative of regional order. In September 2025, China hosted the SCO summit in Tianjin, with Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and India’s Narendra Modi prominently joining hands in a show of solidarity reuters.comreuters.com. At that summit, Putin praised the SCO for exemplifying “genuine multilateralism” and noted approvingly that national currencies were increasingly used in mutual settlements – a direct nod to the de-dollarization drive reuters.comreuters.com. Xi, for his part, used the SCO platform to push what he called a Global Governance Initiative, essentially urging the creation of a new world order where non-Western countries have more sway reuters.com. He even proposed setting up an SCO development bank and invited SCO members to participate in China’s lunar space station project and a new AI cooperation center reuters.com. All of these ideas align closely with Sino-Russian aims: building parallel institutions (a new bank to reduce reliance on Western finance, joint high-tech and space endeavors to rival Western-led projects). Moscow strongly supports these moves, as they amplify the ecosystem of non-Western cooperation in which Russia can be an important player. Notably, at that SCO summit, Modi and Xi met and talked of being “development partners, not rivals,” which was a significant easing of China-India tensions (likely encouraged by both Moscow and Beijing behind the scenes) reuters.com. Russia was undoubtedly pleased to see its two big Asian partners engage positively, as it reduces a point of friction within the blocs.

Despite the high degree of coordination, Russia and China’s foreign policy alignment is not absolute – they have their own priorities and occasionally divergent views. One such divergence is on the issue of UN Security Council reform. Both Russia and China are permanent members of the UNSC and benefit from the status quo (each wields a veto). Other BRICS members, notably India and Brazil, aspire to permanent UNSC seats. Officially, BRICS statements (shaped by China and Russia) support a greater role for India, Brazil, and South Africa in the UN – but in practice, Beijing in particular has been lukewarm on any reform that would give India a seat at the table cepa.orgcepa.org. This has led to some public friction: India has implicitly criticized “a non-Western power” (widely understood to mean China) for blocking UNSC expansion and shielding its ally Pakistan from international scrutiny cepa.org. Russia’s position on UNSC reform is a bit more flexible – Moscow has at times said it would back India for a permanent seat – but it closely coordinates with China on this, and no progress has been made in part because neither wants to dilute their privileged status. Thus, within BRICS forums, the unsaid reality is that China and Russia have slowed the momentum on UN reform, despite other members’ desires cepa.org. This is an example where their alignment with each other (preserving P5 power) overrides alignment with BRICS partners.

Another subtle difference lies in their regional diplomatic approaches. In regions like the Middle East or Africa, China and Russia often end up supporting the same governments but for somewhat different reasons. In Africa, for instance, Russia’s engagement has been largely through security assistance, political support for sovereign governments (even military juntas), and mercenary deployments (like Wagner Group) to expand influence and gain resources. China’s approach in Africa is more economics-first: heavy investment in infrastructure, loans, and trade, along with participation in UN peacekeeping. Both say they respect African countries’ sovereignty and offer an alternative to Western conditional aid, but Russia’s goals are “narrowly protectionist of national governments” (ensuring regime survival and opposing Western intervention) whereas China’s policies reflect its global ambitions like cultivating markets and being seen as Africa’s development partner cepa.org. This means that in diplomatic terms, China often engages more with international institutions in those regions (like supporting UN missions or African Union initiatives) while Russia bypasses them in favor of bilateral influence. These differing styles haven’t led to open conflict between Beijing and Moscow, but they could produce different priorities. For example, on an issue like a conflict in Africa, China might emphasize mediation and economic stabilization, whereas Russia might simply back the incumbent power against “Western meddling.”

That said, both countries find common cause in opposing Western criticism of their partners. In the UN, when resolutions come up on issues like Syria or Venezuela, China and Russia virtually always align their votes (usually vetoing or voting against Western-sponsored resolutions critical of those governments). Their foreign policy alignment is perhaps most solid when it comes to resisting Western democratic norms and human rights pressures. They regularly issue joint statements upholding each other’s governance models – for instance, in the landmark February 4, 2022 joint statement (issued when Putin visited Xi at the Beijing Olympics), China explicitly backed Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion and Russia affirmed its support for the one-China principle and opposition to any form of Taiwanese independence cepa.org. That joint statement declared their partnership had “no limits” and that there were “no forbidden areas” of cooperation cepa.org. While reality has imposed some limits since (especially regarding direct military support), the document signaled how closely their worldviews were aligned on major geopolitical questions on the eve of the Ukraine war.

Military and Security Coordination deserves a brief mention as part of their diplomatic alignment. Though not a formal military alliance, China and Russia have ramped up joint military exercises and security cooperation, which carry diplomatic messaging. They conduct regular joint drills – naval patrols in the Pacific, exercises in East Asia (even as far as joint naval drills near Alaska in 2023–2024), and large multilateral war games under the SCO framework. These activities are coordinated to show solidarity and present a deterrent image to the West and its allies. For example, after 2022, China participated in Russian strategic exercises (Vostok, etc.) even as NATO accused Russia of aggression, telegraphing that Beijing was not going to isolate Moscow. Diplomatically, both also coordinate positions on arms control issues: they have shared stances on opposing the U.S. deployment of missile defenses, and both declined to join certain Western-led security pacts or statements (like criticizing North Korea too harshly).

In summary, on the diplomatic front, Russia and China act as close partners on the world stage, especially in any forum or issue area where they can push back against U.S. or Western influence. In BRICS, they have steered the group’s agenda towards systemic challenges to the Western-led order (calling for financial reform, dollar alternatives, more say for developing countries) cfr.orgcfr.org. In the UN, they often vote as a bloc and use their veto power in a complementary fashion. In newer groupings like the BRICS-Plus format, SCO, or even informal alignments, they appear side by side promoting “true multilateralism” (a phrase they use to suggest a multilateralism not dominated by the West) mfa.gov.cn. All this illustrates a high degree of foreign policy alignment.

However, they also maintain a degree of independence in diplomacy – neither is entirely subordinate to the other’s agenda. Beijing, for instance, has its own complex relations with the EU, U.S., and regions like Southeast Asia, and it calibrates how overtly it aligns with Russia depending on the audience. It has, at times, put a bit of distance – for example, Chinese officials have denied knowing about Russia’s war plans in advance and have presented China as a potential peacemaker in Ukraine, at least in rhetoric, to keep Europe from seeing China as an outright adversary. Similarly, Russia has relationships China doesn’t fully share – notably with India and Vietnam, as discussed later – and in those instances Moscow doesn’t toe Beijing’s line but tries to balance. This indicates that their alignment has limits and is pragmatic: they coordinate where their interests align (which is a growing list of areas), and tactfully disagree or compartmentalize issues where they don’t. In effect, they have each other’s back on core strategic issues (regime security, opposition to Western “interference”), but they are not bound to march in lockstep on every regional question.

Looking ahead, their diplomatic coordination is likely to intensify in any areas involving global governance rules – such as internet governance, AI norms, space governance – where both will want to present alternatives to Western standards. Already, within BRICS and SCO they have set up working groups for things like digital sovereignty und information security, clearly aiming to shape global norms in those arenas jointly. As U.S.-China rivalry and Russia-West confrontation continue, the incentives for Beijing and Moscow to speak with one voice in international forums will remain strong. The challenge for them will be managing the divergent interests of other partners (India, etc.) and not pushing too hard an overt anti-West bloc image that could alienate neutral countries. But to date, they have shown skill in balancing: BRICS, for instance, issues bland statements on contentious political issues (as noted, neutrality on Ukraine) while focusing on positive agendas like development banks or vaccine cooperation – areas where consensus is easier. This reflects conscious Chinese and Russian diplomatic coordination to keep these coalitions broad and attractive, rather than narrowly antagonistic.

In summary, Russia-China diplomatic alignment within BRICS and multilateral fora can be characterized as a synchronized effort to reshape the international order to their liking, stopping short of a formal alliance that would constrain their freedom of action. They provide mutual diplomatic cover (China protecting Russia at the UN, Russia firmly endorsing China’s core interests), co-create initiatives under BRICS/SCO (from financial mechanisms to joint statements on global issues), and reinforce each other’s narratives about a changing world order where the West’s unipolar moment is fading cepa.orgblog.bti-project.org. This coordination greatly amplifies each country’s global influence: together, a China-Russia bloc carries more weight in negotiations and votes than either alone. It also sends a powerful signal to other nations – particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America – that an alternative leadership axis exists, one that might better represent their interests or at least give them leverage with the West. For both Putin and Xi, this is a key strategic outcome of their partnership.

Potential Friction Points and Limitations in Cooperation

While the Russia-China partnership within BRICS is strong, it is not without intrinsic frictions and limitations. Beneath the displays of solidarity lie differences in power, interests, and perspectives that could, if unmanaged, hinder the depth of their cooperation. Here we examine several potential points of tension:

1. Asymmetry – The Junior Partner Problem: A fundamental issue is the growing power imbalance. China’s economy and global clout have surged over the past two decades, far outpacing Russia’s. By some measures, China’s GDP is now roughly 8–9 times larger than Russia’s reuters.com. This translates into Beijing being the dominant economic partner – a reality acknowledged even in Moscow reuters.com. Russia’s dependency on China has sharply increased since 2022, leading some in Russia to worry about becoming overly beholden to Chinese interests cepa.orgcepa.org. This dynamic can breed resentment or at least unease on the Russian side. Russian commentators sometimes warn against the country turning into a raw-material appendage to China’s economy, where Russia exports only oil, gas, and wood, and imports everything else. The data support the concern: as noted, in 2024 China comprised ~36% of Russia’s total trade, while Russia was only ~5% of China’s trade fpri.org. Trade imbalances mean vast Russian trade surpluses with China (Russia sells more to China than it buys in value terms, due to energy exports), but that surplus doesn’t translate to leverage because Russia often needs China to buy those surplus commodities more than China needs any particular Russian product (China can source similar commodities globally).

Moreover, China holds the upper hand in negotiations, as seen in the energy sector. The protracted haggling over gas prices (with China extracting heavy discounts) is a prime example thediplomat.comthediplomat.com. There is a pattern: when Russia finds itself isolated or in urgent need (as after 2014, and again after 2022), China capitalizes on that to secure beneficial terms. Another case was in 2008–2009 when Rosneft and Transneft were desperate for loans during the financial crisis; China gave a $25 billion loan for pipeline construction but only in exchange for 20 years of oil at a locked-in low price and a pipeline branch directly into China cepa.orgcepa.org. In effect, Russia often has to accept a “price of partnership” on Chinese terms. This can cause friction among Russian business and political elites who feel they are getting the short end of deals. For example, after the recent Power of Siberia 2 memorandum, analysts in Russia openly debated whether the project made financial sense given China’s likely low price demands, and Gazprom’s stock dip showed investor skepticism thediplomat.comthediplomat.com.

Russia’s role as primarily an exporter of commodities and importer of finished Chinese goods also hits a nerve domestically. It underlines Russia’s lack of diversification and technological lag. Outside of the defense and nuclear sectors, Russia is not seen as a leading producer of advanced products in the partnership. This has fueled an internal narrative in Russia calling for protecting domestic industries from being swamped by Chinese imports. Indeed, Russia has at times dragged its feet or set limits in economic initiatives that might favor China too much. A telling example: integrating the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (a Russia-led customs union) with China’s Belt and Road Initiative has made only halting progress. While Putin and Xi announced a vision of “linking” the EEU and BRI in 2015, in reality Russia has been wary – likely because EEU members (like Kazakhstan) trade far more with China and could be economically dominated by China’s giant economy if barriers are removed. Russia notably has not signed an EEU-wide free trade agreement with China, even though it did so with smaller economies like Vietnam, and even started talks with others in Asia fpri.org. This reticence suggests Russia fears a flood of cheap Chinese goods undermining its industries and becoming too dependent on Chinese supply chains fpri.org. From China’s perspective, such reluctance is frustrating – Beijing has openly encouraged more “win-win” trade openness, but runs into Russian protectionism at times. These economic frictions underline that the two countries’ interests are not perfectly aligned: China wants greater market access and investment opportunities in Russia (especially in mining, energy, and infrastructure), whereas Russia, though needing Chinese capital, is cautious about losing economic sovereignty.

2. Regional Rivalries and Third-Party Relationships: Russia and China each have other strategic partners and regional interests that don’t always mesh. A prominent example is India. India is a member of BRICS (and the SCO), so it sits in the same forums that China and Russia dominate. However, India is also a historical ally of Russia and simultaneously a strategic rival of China. This triangular dynamic is complicated. Russia has valued its relationship with India for decades – India is a top buyer of Russian arms and has been a diplomatic friend to Moscow (it maintained neutrality on the Ukraine war, for instance, refusing to join sanctions on Russia). China, on the other hand, has border disputes and a history of war (1962) with India, and today they jostle for influence in Asia. Within BRICS, India often takes a different line: for example, India has been reluctant to endorse some anti-Western statements and is wary of BRICS becoming too China-centric cfr.org. During the 2023 BRICS expansion debate, India (along with Brazil) was cautious about accepting a flood of new members favored by China, fearing BRICS might turn into a China-led club with an anti-West tilt cfr.orgcepa.org. Modi’s government wanted to preserve BRICS as a platform that also serves India’s interests (which include maintaining good ties with the US). Eventually India acquiesced to expansion, but this showed a crack: India’s rivalry with China can inject tension that Russia has to manage.

Russia essentially tries to play the peacemaker or balancer between China and India. The Kremlin enjoys good relations with both New Delhi and Beijing, and it has taken a stance of neutrality on their disputes. For instance, when deadly skirmishes erupted between Indian and Chinese troops in the Himalayas in 2020, Russia remained neutral and continued business-as-usual with both (even hosting meetings where Indian and Chinese ministers met on the sidelines to talk) fpri.orgfpri.org. Russia also has continued supplying advanced weapons to India (like the S-400 air defense systems, delivered even as recently as 2022-2023) fpri.orgfpri.org, which does not sit well with Beijing. China would prefer Russia not strengthen the military of a country it sees as a potential adversary. On the flip side, India’s closer defense ties with the U.S. in recent years (partly a response to China) are something Russia views with some alarm, but it hasn’t altered Russia’s commitment to its India partnership. So far, Russia has managed a delicate diplomatic tightrope: it affirms strong ties with India (calling it a “trusted friend”), while simultaneously declaring its “best friendship” with China. Both Beijing and New Delhi accept this for now – China perhaps tolerating Russia-India ties because they predate the Sino-Russian rapprochement, and India understanding Russia will not cut off China. But this balancing act could become harder if India-China relations worsen (e.g., another border war). In a scenario where India might expect Russia to support it or China expects Russia to side with Beijing, Moscow could be put in an uncomfortable spot. Such an event would test the Russia-China partnership: how far would Russia go in backing China if it meant alienating India (and losing a big arms market and ally)? The likely answer is Russia would attempt to stay neutral, which might irritate Beijing. This is a latent friction point – currently mitigated, but potentially disruptive.

Another regional area is Southeast Asia, specifically countries like Vietnam. Russia has a long-standing friendship with Vietnam (a fellow socialist ally from Cold War days). Vietnam, however, has serious disputes with China (they fought a border war in 1979 and clash over South China Sea claims). Russia remains Vietnam’s primary arms supplier and energy investor. Joint Russian-Vietnamese oil ventures operate in waters that China also claims. On one occasion, China pressured Vietnam to halt one such project (in 2018) and Vietnam complied, but it put Russia in an awkward position between losing business or angering Beijing. So far, China has not overtly challenged Russia’s role in Vietnam, but it’s easy to imagine that if China-Vietnam tensions spike, Beijing might expect Russia not to provide certain arms or support to Hanoi. Similarly, Russia’s ties with Japan or South Korea (though currently limited by sanctions and the Ukraine fallout) could be a factor – China wouldn’t want Russia cozying up to U.S. allies in Asia.

Central Asia is another region worth noting. These five former Soviet republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, etc.) have traditionally been in Russia’s sphere of influence, but in the past two decades China has become a major economic force there (with the BRI projects, loans, and trade). Officially, Moscow and Beijing say their interests in Central Asia “cooperate harmoniously” – Russia provides security (e.g., through things like the CSTO military alliance) and China focuses on economic development. And indeed, both share an interest in keeping Western influence minimal in Central Asia. However, there is an undercurrent of competition: as China’s economic footprint grows, some in Russia worry that Central Asia is drifting into China’s orbit, weakening Russia’s leverage over its own back yard. There have been instances where local protests or political changes (like in Kazakhstan 2022) raised questions: China generally supports whatever keeps stability (to protect its investments), while Russia sent troops under CSTO to quell unrest. If at some point their preferred approaches diverged – say a Central Asian state tilted more towards China’s model vs Russia’s – there could be friction. So far, that has not escalated, but the potential for rivalry exists, even if quietly.

3. Vision and Ideology – Global Roles Mismatch: Russia and China often speak from the same sheet about the world order, but the Skala of their global ambitions differs. China’s vision as a rising superpower is more sweeping: Xi Jinping speaks of a “community of common destiny for mankind”, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, etc., aiming to reshape norms and institutions on a worldwide scale. Russia, while it has great-power aspirations, has more limited resources and tends to focus on immediate spheres (Eurasia) and reactive opposition to Western moves. In practical terms, China invests heavily in soft power and economic statecraft across continents (from Africa to Latin America), whereas Russia’s presence in those far regions is thinner (mostly arms sales, some mercenaries, or Soviet-era goodwill). Within BRICS, this can lead to different priorities. China might push for collective action on issues like development finance, climate change, or pandemic response, which burnish its leadership credentials among developing countries. Russia, with a smaller economy and more isolated financial system, cannot contribute as much on those fronts, and tends to prioritize political-security issues (like forming united fronts against sanctions or Western interventions).

One concrete example: development aid. China is now one of the biggest lenders to developing nations, including some BRICS members or applicants. It may envision BRICS as coordinating development projects or debt relief initiatives. Russia is not a significant development lender and might see little role for itself there, beyond endorsing China’s efforts. Instead, Russia is more interested in BRICS being a political bloc that sends messages in international forums (e.g., voting together or issuing statements). This difference isn’t antagonistic, but it means China sometimes effectively leads on certain multilateral initiatives without Russia being an equal driver. If BRICS expands into more economic cooperation (say a BRICS free trade area, or large joint infrastructure projects), China would dominate due to its financial might, and Russia could become a junior participant, which might not sit well with the Kremlin’s desire for parity. Already within the NDB, China is the largest shareholder (about 30% stake) and has headquarters in Shanghai; Russia is a major stakeholder too, but clearly second to China in influence there. If that pattern repeats across new BRICS mechanisms, Russia may feel sidelined.

Ideologically, both countries share authoritarian governance models and anti-Western narratives, but their public diplomacy styles differ. China often couches its global ambitions in the language of win-win cooperation and refrains from overt anti-West crusading when speaking to a broad audience (it prefers implicit criticism, except in combative “Wolf Warrior” moments). Russia, especially under Putin in recent years, has leaned into blunt anti-West rhetoric, portraying BRICS and others as engaged in an existential struggle against Western hegemony and liberal values. For example, Russian officials (and state media) frequently characterize the West as decadent or neo-colonial and present BRICS as the vanguard of a new world majority rising against Western arrogance blog.bti-project.orgblog.bti-project.org. China also criticizes Western hegemony, but usually in more measured tones internationally – focusing on positive terms like multilateralism and fairness rather than civilizational clash. The difference is partly audience-driven: Russia doesn’t mind being seen as openly confrontational, whereas China, trying to woo European, Asian, and African partners, often tries not to force countries to choose sides openly. This led, for instance, to joint statements carefully worded to avoid scaring countries that have good relations with the US. When Putin pressed in BRICS or SCO for very strident anti-West statements, China (and others) at times watered them down. In 2024, reports suggest Brazil and India insisted that BRICS not be characterized as an anti-West or anti-US alliance, and China went along with that to keep unity cepa.org.

So a limitation emerges: if Russia, feeling embattled, pushes BRICS into a more confrontational posture than some members (and possibly China, in certain contexts) are comfortable with, Beijing might restrain that. We saw a hint in the Kazan 2024 BRICS summit: Putin trumpeted de-dollarization and an anti-dollar payment system theguardian.com, which alarmed India and Brazil who don’t want to sever ties with the West theguardian.com. The final communiqué made only limited progress on that front, showing that there are brakes applied by others. China likely supported Putin’s de-dollarization call in principle – it also seeks to reduce dollar reliance – but it has to balance the politics. Such scenarios mean that Russia’s most hardline stances aren’t always fully adopted by BRICS due to the collective nature of the group. And China, valuing BRICS cohesion and its own global image, may sometimes counsel moderation, even if that disappoints Moscow. To Russia’s credit, it appears to recognize these limits and also values not alienating key partners like India or Brazil. But this dynamic is a constraint: Sino-Russian cooperation in BRICS can only go as far as the most cautious member’s red lines at any given time. If China and Russia were just a duo, they might take bolder action, but within BRICS they must consider others. This inherently limits how extreme their joint positions can be – a built-in mitigating factor to their partnership.

4. Domestic Public Opinion and Historical Mistrust: Public sentiment and historical baggage also impose subtle friction. In Russia, while the government extols friendship with China, ordinary Russians have mixed views. Surveys in past years showed improving attitudes toward China, but there remain undercurrents of suspicion – especially in regions like Siberia and the Far East which border China. There’s a long-standing fear (sometimes exaggerated) of Chinese migration or economic domination in those sparsely populated Russian territories cepa.orgcepa.org. Memories of the Sino-Soviet split and even the border clashes of 1969 persist in older generations and the military. Nationalist critics occasionally argue that Russia should “watch its back” with China, citing how the Chinese public still remembers territories ceded to the Russian Empire in the 19th century. Indeed, Chinese historical narratives do include references to “unequal treaties” where imperial Russia took large chunks of land in the Far East fpri.orgfpri.org. Although Beijing and Moscow settled all border disputes by 2008 and emphasize the past is resolved, nationalist rhetoric can revive these issues. For example, Chinese social media occasionally sees maps or comments calling Vladivostok by its old Chinese name (Haishenwai), which causes Russian media to bristle. On the Russian side, some analysts point out that the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s collapsed in part due to mistrust and imbalances, implying that a tight alliance now could face similar fate.

Significantly, a prominent Chinese voice, Fu Ying (former vice foreign minister), wrote an article pondering “Are We Allies or Partners?” in which she stressed lessons from history: she noted past unequal treaties and how even the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance ended in estrangement within a decade fpri.orgfpri.org. Her advice was that China should be cautious about alliances, remembering how quickly fortunes can change. This perspective, coming from a figure in China’s establishment, indicates Beijing’s own wariness about over-committing to Russia. It values Russia, but will not subordinate itself or blindly follow Russia – an alliance could drag China into unnecessary conflicts. For instance, if Russia escalated the Ukraine war in a way that risked nuclear conflict or global economic chaos, China would likely distance itself despite rhetoric of friendship, because Beijing’s priority is global stability for its own development. Already, China has implicitly signaled limits – e.g., Chinese officials have said the partnership with Russia “is not an alliance” and that China is not taking sides in the Ukraine war, at least not in a military sense cepa.orgcepa.org.

Thus, lingering mutual mistrust – though much reduced from Cold War times – still acts as a ceiling. Neither country completely trusts anyone, including each other, due to their realist worldview. They cooperate extensively but keep options open. This is why they still maintain separate networks – Russia doesn’t, for instance, share its most advanced nuclear or missile technologies with China, and China does not give Russia its cutting-edge military drones or fighter jet designs. They engage in arms trade (Russia sells to China), but carefully; for example, Russia held off for years on selling certain top-end weapons to China (like Su-35 fighters or S-400 missiles) fearing technology theft, until geopolitical needs in the 2010s made them relent. Even then, Russia’s arms sales to China slowed after China started making near-copies (the experience with Su-27/Chinese J-11 fighters caused Russian wariness). This shows a residue of strategic mistrust: each is mindful that today’s friend could be tomorrow’s competitor if circumstances shift.

5. External Pressures and Crisis Scenarios: The partnership could also be tested by external events. One scenario often discussed is a potential conflict involving China – for instance, over Taiwan. If Beijing were to take military action on Taiwan and face Western sanctions or military pushback similar to what Russia is experiencing over Ukraine, would Russia step up materially to support China? Moscow has so far given full diplomatic backing to China’s stance on Taiwan (asserting Taiwan is an internal matter and criticizing U.S. interference). If an actual war erupted, Russia might provide intelligence support, more joint military demonstrations elsewhere (to divert U.S. attention), and possibly increased energy supplies to China if China faced embargoes. But it’s unclear if Russia would directly participate or if it even could given its own constraints – doing so could bring NATO attention to Russia’s vulnerable spots. Conversely, if Russia’s conflict in Europe escalated dramatically (say incidents with NATO states), China would face a hard choice of whether to stick neck out further for Russia. Likely China would still try to stay formally neutral enough to avoid devastating secondary sanctions on itself. In either case, a severe crisis could expose the limits of their military cooperation – each might prioritize its own survival over the other’s. That recognition, quietly, probably already exists in Beijing and Moscow and acts as a caution: they push the envelope in opposing the West, but try not to cross certain red lines that would force that ultimate test.

Another external factor is leadership transitions. Currently, the personal rapport between Putin and Xi is often cited as a factor in the closeness (they have met dozens of times and refer to each other as friends). If one of them were to leave power unexpectedly, the relationship could lose momentum or trust until rebuilt with new people. However, given both have entrenched authoritarian systems, abrupt leadership change seems unlikely in the near term (except via health or other shocks). Still, in the longer run, a post-Putin Russia might re-evaluate its dependence on China, or a post-Xi China might recalibrate how it balances relations with the West vs Russia. Western strategy has sometimes banked on the idea of driving a wedge between China and Russia, perhaps by enticing Russia away from China with security guarantees or by tempting China with economic rewards to isolate Russia cepa.org. For now, such attempts have not yielded results – both Beijing and Moscow see the value of sticking together. But one cannot rule out that future circumstances (like a different U.S. administration offering a “Nixon goes to China”-style deal to one of them) could introduce tension. Analysts note that their partnership, while robust, is ultimately based on converging interests rather than deep affection, and if those interests diverged due to a changed global context, cracks could appear.

In summary, the Russia-China partnership within BRICS is not a seamless unity – it has pressure points. The asymmetry in economic and political power is perhaps the most structural one: it inherently creates a senior-junior dynamic that Russia begrudgingly accepts but could chafe under if the gap widens further. Differing third-party ties (like those with India or Vietnam) force each to compromise or compartmentalize, which they have managed adeptly so far, but those balancing acts could be strained by future crises. Their historical experiences and national pride impose limits on trust – memories of past betrayals remind them to avoid over-dependence. As one observer put it, this is a partnership of “convenience and conviction” but not one of blind faith; each side keeps an exit option and a wary eye even as they move in the same direction.

Crucially, despite these frictions, both governments have shown a strong political will to manage and minimize disagreements. They are acutely aware that their cooperation is mutually beneficial against a backdrop of Western pressure. Hence, they have been pragmatic in addressing issues – for instance, quietly discussing concerns (like Russia’s about Chinese copies of Russian weapons, or China’s about Russia’s India ties) and finding workarounds. The high-level strategic dialogue (regular meetings of officials, joint commissions, etc.) helps air differences before they become problems. And on many potential flashpoints, they have found workable compromises: e.g., on Central Asia they established a pattern of Russia handling security and China economics; on India, Russia offered to mediate and both China/India let SCO/BRICS be a neutral ground; on economic imbalance, China has made some token investments in Russia’s non-energy sector to show support, and Russia has agreed to use yuan more to ease China’s concerns.

The biggest limitation may simply be that beyond a point, their interests diverge. They will cooperate up to where it serves both – and that range has been expanding – but if something falls outside that range, cooperation will stall. For instance, a full military alliance or a defense pact (like NATO-style) is not in the cards because neither wants to be dragged into the other’s wars or constrained by alliance obligations cepa.org. They prefer the freedom to “agree to disagree” if needed. In the UN votes on the Ukraine war, for example, China did not vote with Russia (it abstained) – which Moscow accepted as understandable, and Russia in turn didn’t pressure China to support it more than was feasible. Such tacit understanding of limits actually helps keep the partnership stable: by not forcing each other into uncomfortable corners, they avoid a rupture.

Overall, while points of friction exist, they are being effectively managed at present. Both Putin and Xi (and their strategists) appear to calculate that the benefits of alignment far outweigh the downsides, and that any internal differences are secondary in the face of the larger confrontation with the West. As long as that strategic context remains – essentially, as long as Washington and its allies are seen as hostile or blocking Chinese/Russian interests – Beijing and Moscow are likely to downplay their differences and accentuate common goals. The frictions might limit how far or fast integration goes (preventing, say, an EU-like economic union or a NATO-like military alliance between them), but they are unlikely to undo the partnership. The greatest test of these fault lines would come if the external pressure that currently binds them together were removed or radically reduced – a scenario where, for instance, Russia-West relations normalized or U.S.-China rivalry cooled significantly. In the current reality, however, shared adversarial relations with the West act as a powerful glue that keeps these cracks from widening.

The Role of BRICS Expansion and New Members in the Strategic Relationship

One of the most significant recent developments in BRICS – and one driven largely by China and Russia – is the expansion of the grouping. Originally a five-nation bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), BRICS moved in 2023–2024 to invite new members. Both Moscow and Beijing strongly favored expanding BRICS, seeing it as an opportunity to amplify the bloc’s voice and their own influence cfr.org. This culminated in BRICS extending membership offers to six countries at the 2023 Johannesburg summit, of which five accepted: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, the UAE, and Ethiopia (Argentina was also invited but its entry was postponed after a change of government) cfr.orgcfr.org. These countries joined as full members in January 2024 (except Argentina). Subsequently, at the 2024 BRICS summit hosted by Russia in Kazan, the bloc created a new category of “BRICS Partner Countries” – a kind of affiliate status that granted a dozen other interested nations (from Kazakhstan to Nigeria to Thailand) participation in BRICS events without full membership cfr.org. And by 2025, even Indonesia was admitted as a new full member, reflecting the continued momentum of enlargement cfr.org.

For Russia and China, this expansion was a strategic win that they actively engineered. In fact, it was President Xi Jinping who first formally proposed considering BRICS expansion during a virtual BRICS summit in 2022 cepa.org. Russia eagerly embraced the idea as well. They then worked together to sway the more hesitant BRICS members (India and Brazil) to accept new entrants cepa.orgcepa.org. Brazil and India had initial reservations – they worried that adding many new members, especially countries close to China, could dilute their own influence and make BRICS more explicitly anti-Western than they wanted cfr.orgcepa.org. Beijing and Moscow had to engage in diplomacy to get them on board. For example, Brazil’s Lula government only agreed after ensuring it had a say in who got invited (Brazil reportedly objected to including Venezuela or Nicaragua, which it saw as too controversial) cepa.org. India, facing a proposal it was uneasy with, ultimately acquiesced but, tellingly, both India and Brazil insisted on a public messaging that BRICS is not an “anti-Western” alliance even as it expanded cepa.org. This was a nod to their concerns that China and Russia might steer the enlarged BRICS into a purely anti-U.S. posture, which they wanted to avoid.

From the perspective of Moscow and Beijing, what are the benefits of BRICS expansion? First, it boosts the collective weight of the bloc. With the new members, BRICS now encompasses around 45% of the world’s population and nearly 1/3 of global GDP (in PPP terms) blog.bti-project.org. The inclusion of major economies like Saudi Arabia (the world’s biggest oil exporter) and the UAE, as well as a regional heavyweight like Egypt and a staunch anti-West voice like Iran, significantly increases BRICS’ geopolitical and economic clout. This aligns with both China’s and Russia’s goal of showcasing that the “global majority” stands with them or at least is not aligned with the West blog.bti-project.org. Russian foreign policy aide Yury Ushakov described China, Russia (and Iran) as the core of an “anti-hegemonic vanguard” of the world majority blog.bti-project.org. By bringing more countries into BRICS, Beijing and Moscow can bolster the narrative that most of the world is looking for alternatives to Western leadership. It’s a direct rebuttal to the G7 or “Global NATO” narratives. As Putin said, it would be wrong to ignore the “unprecedented interest” of countries wishing to join BRICS theguardian.com – implying BRICS represents a broader movement in world politics.

Second, expansion offers pragmatic advantages in creating networks that bypass Western sanctions and systems. Russia, in particular, sees new BRICS members as potential partners in sanctions evasion or mitigation. Iran is experienced in evading sanctions and could share tactics or cooperate with Russia on that front. The Gulf states (Saudi and UAE) bring deep financial resources and have shown they can act independently of Washington’s wishes (the UAE, for instance, has not enforced all Western sanctions and has been a re-export hub for sanctioned goods). Having them in BRICS opens avenues for Russia to do business and finance in non-dollar terms through friendly channels. It’s telling that Russia advocated a “BRICS-Partner” model specifically to focus on its priority of sanctions management blog.bti-project.org. This suggests Moscow wanted a large umbrella that could include as many friendly states as possible in at least some capacity, thereby building a wide anti-sanctions coalition or at least a shield. New members also mean new bilateral deals under a political umbrella: e.g., Russia can push energy deals with Saudi/UAE or arms deals with Egypt/Iran under the rubric of BRICS cooperation, adding a layer of political cover.

China’s interests in expansion overlap but also have their own flavor. Beijing sees adding members as broadening its global influence – especially in regions like the Middle East and Africa where the new members hail from. China already has strong ties with many of them (it’s a top trade partner and investor in Saudi, UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, etc.). By enfolding them into BRICS, China can more systematically integrate these relationships into its vision of a non-Western bloc and perhaps into initiatives like the Belt and Road or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. For instance, China has long wanted oil-rich Gulf states to trade oil in yuan; bringing Saudi Arabia and UAE into BRICS provides a multilateral forum to discuss energy currency arrangements or investment projects under NDB financing. Indeed, after being invited, Saudi Arabia expressed interest in joining the NDB and possibly selling oil in non-dollar currencies. So expansion serves China’s goal of internationalizing the yuan and securing energy supply lines.

However, expansion also introduces new complexities and potential frictions into BRICS – which China and Russia will have to carefully manage. The new members are not monolithic; they have their own disputes and varying orientations toward the West. For example, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been regional rivals for decades (Sunni vs Shia power centers), involved in proxy conflicts in Yemen, Syria, etc. Though they signed a surprise reconciliation deal in 2023 (brokered by China, notably), underlying competition remains. Within an expanded BRICS, if Iran and Saudi pursue opposing agendas or vie for leadership in representing the Middle East, it could cause internal tensions. China and Russia would likely try to keep them focused on common goals (like urging both to invest in BRICS development projects or jointly advocate for oil market stability), but the risk of their rivalry seeping into BRICS discussions is there cfr.orgcfr.org. Similarly, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have a competitive relationship (diverging interests in OPEC, economic competition in the Gulf, and different alignments in conflicts like Libya or Sudan) cfr.org. Some experts warned that this rivalry could carry into BRICS and complicate consensus cfr.org.

Moreover, new members have different relationships with the West. Iran and Russia are outright adversaries of Washington cfr.org; China is a systemic competitor to the U.S.; but countries like Brazil, India, South Africa (original BRICS) have fairly balanced relations and don’t want to burn bridges with the U.S. or EU cfr.org. The Gulf monarchies (Saudi, UAE) are traditional U.S. security partners (though more independent of late) cfr.org, and Egypt receives substantial military aid from the U.S. Ethiopia has been courted by both China and the West, etc. This diversity means consensus-building will be harder with 10+ members than it was with 5. China and Russia will have to avoid over-politicizing BRICS if they want to keep everyone on board. It’s telling that after expansion, leaders like Lula of Brazil reiterated that BRICS should not turn into an anti-West crusade cfr.org. In Kazan 2024, Brazil (backed by India) sought to steer the agenda more toward development issues and less towards overt anti-American rhetoric, especially as Brazil was chairing BRICS in 2025. Russia had pushed a very anti-West tone during its 2024 chairmanship (Putin even invited dozens of Global South leaders to a BRICS+ outreach in St. Petersburg to rally support theguardian.com), but Brazil signaled a pivot to a more neutral stance as it took over cfr.orgcfr.org. China, for its part, has to calibrate because it doesn’t want to alienate important partners like Saudi Arabia by making BRICS too hostile to the U.S. (the Saudis still value their U.S. ties, even if they’re hedging). At the same time, Beijing and Moscow will use the presence of friendly countries like Iran to bolster anti-sanctions and anti-dollar initiatives, which align with those countries’ interests.

So the role of expansion in the Sino-Russian relationship is somewhat double-edged: on one hand, it strengthens their hand – giving them more allies or sympathetic states within the BRICS framework, which can amplify Sino-Russian proposals. On the other hand, it adds more stakeholders whose interests must be balanced, meaning China and Russia might at times have to moderate their own positions to keep the bloc unified. For instance, if China and Russia want a very strongly worded statement on a geopolitical issue, but the Saudis or Indians object, they might have to dilute it. The Johannesburg II Declaration of 2023 (which announced expansion) and the subsequent 2024 Kazan Declaration grew much longer and more detailed than previous ones, covering many areas of consensus, but carefully avoiding language that any member finds unacceptable cepa.orgcepa.org. This indicates intensive diplomacy to craft language agreeable to a bigger, more diverse group. The increase from 75 articles in 2022’s declaration to 131 articles in 2024’s declaration itself shows BRICS had to accommodate more viewpoints and initiatives cepa.orgcepa.org. Much of this expansion in content was driven by “logrolling” – trading support on each other’s priorities so everyone sees their interests reflected cepa.orgcepa.org. China and Russia spearheaded that approach, encouraging an “intensification of ministerial meetings, expert groups, and sub-summits” to cover everything from finance to climate to culture cepa.org. This created a broader agenda that could hold an enlarged BRICS together – focusing on practical cooperation and less divisive issues, while sidestepping the truly contentious ones (like Ukraine) cepa.orgcepa.org.

For Russia particularly, expansion and the flurry of activity under its 2024 chairmanship were partly about showing it still has global reach despite Western isolation. Hosting the BRICS summit in Kazan (even though Putin had to attend by video due to the ICC warrant issue) was a prestige moment – Russia could gather leaders of major countries on its soil (or at least under its chairship) theguardian.comtheguardian.com. Moscow scheduled 250 BRICS-related events in 2024 – an enormous number – as if to compensate for its exclusion from Western forums blog.bti-project.org. Some reports said other members felt “overwhelmed” by the avalanche of Russian-organized meetings and frameworks blog.bti-project.org. But Russia was essentially investing heavily in BRICS as a platform for its global engagement, since avenues like the G7 or even wider G20 (to an extent) were closed off to it. China certainly understood this need and supported Russia’s active chairmanship – Xi even specifically said China would support Russia hosting a successful BRICS in 2024 beltandroadforum.org. From Beijing’s viewpoint, a high-profile Russian-led BRICS that year kept Russia firmly anchored in a cooperative role and not isolated, which was in China’s interest (preventing a desperate Russia from potentially acting erratically or being cornered).

China likewise benefits from expansion in more subtle ways: it gives China more diplomatic clout without China having to be in the spotlight alone. In other words, China can advance initiatives (like the BRICS expansion itself, which was a Chinese proposal cepa.org) but frame them as group decisions, spreading responsibility. This helps China avoid some pushback – smaller countries might be less wary of a broad BRICS push than of a unilateral Chinese push. Expansion also allows China to effectively lead from behind in some instances. For example, in inviting new members from the Middle East and Africa, China leveraged its strong ties to lobby for them (China has massive investments and influence with Saudi, UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia), but it let South Africa or Russia also champion some of those to show consensus. Now, with these countries inside, China can convene mini-laterals on the sidelines: e.g., China can hold a meeting of BRICS energy ministers (including Saudi, Russia, UAE) to talk about oil market cooperation – a forum that wouldn’t exist under the old BRICS composition. This potentially helps China shape global commodity markets and financial arrangements in a friendly setting.

BRICS expansion also has a signaling effect on global governance: it suggests that power is shifting to the East and South, which dovetails with both Beijing’s and Moscow’s narratives. For China, it affirms its claim that Western-led institutions don’t meet the needs of developing countries, thus countries are turning to groupings like BRICS for inclusion. For Russia, it’s a rebuttal to Western claims that Russia is isolated; instead Russia can claim to be at the forefront of a “rising coalition of non-Western powers.” In response, the G7 and others have had to acknowledge that they need to engage more with the so-called Global South, indicating BRICS’ expansion already forced a recalibration in international discourse.

Looking to the future, how will the inclusion of new members affect China-Russia relations within BRICS? On balance, it is likely to cement their partnership further but require more joint leadership to manage the bloc. China and Russia, as the two strongest and most proactively anti-Western members, will likely coordinate even more closely to guide BRICS as it evolves. They have essentially positioned themselves as the dual lynchpins of BRICS: without their joint agreement, nothing major in BRICS moves forward. For instance, if new members propose something that China and Russia don’t favor, Beijing and Moscow can effectively veto it through consensus norms. Conversely, if China and Russia agree on a direction, they can usually persuade or pressure the rest to follow (with some concessions). Their pre-summit consultations will become even more important. We might see, for example, China-Russia working groups to formulate common proposals before tabling them at BRICS meetings, ensuring a united front. There are already signs of that – the Global Times (a Chinese state media) reported in 2024 that enhanced China-Russia coordination would “boost multilateral collaboration,” referencing how they were lining up stances in institutions including BRICS cepa.orgcepa.org.

However, they will also need to practice some restraint and flexibility. With more diverse members, Beijing and Moscow can’t simply dictate the agenda; they must act as consensus builders. This might somewhat moderate the extremes of their positions. Notably, India and Brazil’s presence alongside the new entrants ensures BRICS remains a mixed bag ideologically cepa.orgcepa.org. As a CEPA report observed, BRICS is still heterogeneous despite Sino-Russian attempts to rally it – the declarations of recent summits carefully note the diversity of views (for example, including a clause acknowledging that BRICS members have different takes on the Ukraine conflict) cepa.org. China and Russia have accepted this necessity; they realized that trying to enforce ideological alignment on everything would be counterproductive cepa.org. So they’ve focused BRICS on issues where common interest overrides ideological differences (e.g., climate change where all oppose Western trade measures, or development finance where everyone wants more funds) cepa.orgcepa.org. This approach of “issue-based convergence” through logrolling has worked to some extent, and will be even more crucial post-expansion.

One potential area to watch is how new members might support or challenge Sino-Russian interests in specific cases. For example, Iran’s entry is almost certainly a plus for Russia – Iran will firmly back Russia in criticisms of NATO, justify Russia’s stance on Ukraine (Iran has been supplying drones to Russia, forging its own “no limits” military cooperation with Moscow), and join China and Russia in promoting de-dollarization (Iran is already de-dollarizing trade due to sanctions). Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while not anti-West per se, have clashed with U.S. policies recently (OPEC+ oil cuts against U.S. wishes, engaging with China’s diplomatic initiatives). They might side with China-Russia on economic issues like defending oil producers’ interests, pushing back on Western climate agendas or sanctions. But if BRICS were to take up a human rights issue or something touching on their concerns, they may demur. Egypt and Ethiopia bring African perspective; Egypt has ties with both Russia (militarily) and China (economically) and likely will support Sino-Russian calls for more South-South cooperation. Ethiopia might align with China/Russia especially in opposing Western “interference” (given it felt the West was too critical during its recent civil conflict).

The inclusion of Indonesia by 2025 is interesting: Indonesia is a non-aligned Asian democracy with good relations with both China and the West. Its presence could bolster voices like India’s that want a more moderate BRICS. But Indonesia also has reasons to cooperate with China (economically) and with Russia (it buys some weapons, and values a multipolar order where ASEAN has space). So even new members like Indonesia might align with Sino-Russian positions on certain global issues (e.g., reforming financial institutions) while being quieter on others (Indonesia might not want to get involved in Russia-West fights or China-US disputes overtly). This again underscores that China and Russia will sometimes have to act as behind-the-scenes coordinators rather than enforcers.

Finally, it’s worth noting that expansion to include countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran effectively brings the Middle East into BRICS, a region where previously BRICS had no direct member (aside from observer ties). This could open up new collaborative efforts, like BRICS discussions on Middle East stability or energy security. China and Russia both have significant stakes in the Middle East and often align in their views (both, for instance, opposed Western military interventions in Syria and Libya, and both advocate a balance in the Israel-Palestine issue leaning toward support for Palestinians at the UN). With regional powers from the Middle East now in BRICS, Beijing and Moscow can use the forum to shape narratives on Middle East conflicts more strongly. For example, after the 2024 Israel-Gaza war, a BRICS statement condemned actions in Gaza strongly – presumably pushed by countries like South Africa, China, etc., and with no objections from new members like the UAE (which also criticized Israel). This suggests BRICS could become a louder collective voice on international crises, which aligns with Sino-Russian aims to counter Western narratives.

In conclusion, the expansion of BRICS acts as a force multiplier for the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership, but also requires adept joint stewardship. China and Russia were the architects of the expansion (overcoming internal hesitations) cepa.orgcepa.org, and they will be the ones largely responsible for integrating the new members into a coherent platform. Success for them will mean leveraging the new members’ strengths (financial clout, regional influence, shared anti-hegemonic sentiment) to further their overarching goals – like promoting alternative financial systems, legitimizing their foreign policy stands, and championing multipolar institutions. It will also mean preventing the “BRICS+” from descending into discord due to the members’ varied interests. So far, they have managed that by broadening the agenda to find common denominators and by avoiding polarizing moves within BRICS cepa.orgcepa.org.

If they can continue on this path, an expanded BRICS could significantly bolster Sino-Russian influence globally. We might see, for instance, BRICS coordinating positions in the UN more than before (with potentially 10-11 votes acting in concert in the General Assembly, which is not negligible). We might also see an expanded NDB lending to more countries, challenging World Bank/IMF in certain regions – something both Beijing and Moscow desire (the NDB has already approved $30+ billion in projects cfr.org, and new members will bring in new capital to increase that). Possibly, China and Russia might revisit the idea of a BRICS reserve currency or a commodity-backed currency unit now that they have more major commodity producers on board (Russia, Saudi, UAE, Brazil, etc.). Such ambitious ideas were previously tabled but never implemented; with more collective heft, they might be explored again, as suggested by ongoing de-dollarization discussions theguardian.com.

In any case, the strategic China-Russia tandem within BRICS is set to continue steering the bloc’s evolution. Expansion has made BRICS more influential, which serves their purposes, but also more complex, which will test their diplomatic coordination. It is likely to bind China and Russia even closer, as they will consult frequently to align strategies on handling the new members and maximizing BRICS’ potential. In essence, BRICS expansion has enlarged the stage on which the Russia-China partnership operates, offering them greater reach – but it also means they have a bigger cast to direct, requiring careful co-production. So far, they have shown themselves willing and capable of that role, underscoring the resilience and adaptability of their relationship.

Conclusion and Future Outlook

The trajectory of Russian-Chinese relations within BRICS is poised to strengthen further, underpinned by a combination of shared interests and external pressures that make their partnership both necessary and mutually beneficial. Over the next few years, we can expect even deeper economic and diplomatic collaboration between Moscow and Beijing under the BRICS framework – albeit one calibrated to respect each side’s sensitivities and the broader group’s unity.

Economically, trade and investment ties will likely continue to grow, though perhaps not at the breakneck pace seen immediately after 2022. Having reached a record $245 billion in trade in 2024 reuters.com, both countries have set their sights on new heights (Putin and Xi have informally mentioned $300 billion as a next milestone). Achieving this will involve Russia exporting more energy and commodities to China – with planned projects like the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline coming online in the early 2030s to dramatically boost gas volumes thediplomat.com – and China in turn exporting more machinery, vehicles, and consumer goods to fill Russia’s needs. Energy cooperation will remain the linchpin. Russia is on track to become one of China’s top oil and gas suppliers, which will bind their economies for decades (long-term contracts into the 2050s). This interdependence in energy serves strategic goals: Russia secures a stable demand for its resources as it’s shut out of Western markets, and China gains a reliable energy source that isn’t vulnerable to U.S. naval control (as Middle East oil routes are).

On the financial front, we will likely see continued de-dollarization and financial integration. The proportion of trade settled in rubles and yuan is set to remain very high – possibly the default for all Russia-China transactions theguardian.com. The Chinese yuan could further entrench itself in Russia as a quasi-reserve currency; by 2025, Russian officials indicated that well over half of Russia’s imports might be paid in “friendly” currencies (yuan, rupee, etc.). There is discussion within BRICS, encouraged by China and Russia, of creating a common payment system or even exploring a BRICS digital currency to facilitate trade theguardian.comtheguardian.com. While a full-fledged BRICS currency remains a distant prospect (given technical and political hurdles), we may see incremental steps: for instance, greater interoperability of China’s CIPS and Russia’s SPFS, more currency swap agreements among central banks, and the NDB offering loans in yuan or rubles to reduce dollar exposure cepa.orgcepa.org. Such steps would cement a financial alliance that insulates both economies from Western sanctions to an extent.

Diplomatically, Russia and China will almost certainly continue their close coordination in global forums. They have found a comfortable rhythm in presenting a united front on key issues – from vetoing UN resolutions they jointly oppose, to issuing statements through BRICS and SCO that reflect their worldview. This pattern is unlikely to change as long as geopolitical rivalry with the West persists. If anything, as Western pressure remains (e.g., NATO’s stance towards Russia, U.S. strategic competition with China), Beijing and Moscow will double down on leveraging BRICS as a platform to voice alternative views on international crises and norms cepa.org. We can expect them to push for mentions of concepts like “indivisible security” (a term Russia promotes to critique NATO expansion) and “community of shared future” (a Chinese concept) in BRICS documents, blending their narratives. They will also likely coordinate more on who leads BRICS initiatives year by year – with China perhaps taking lead on economic programs (given its resources) and Russia taking lead on political/security pronouncements.

One litmus test for their diplomatic alignment will be how BRICS as a bloc behaves in international crises. For example, on the ongoing Ukraine conflict, if any peace proposals or negotiations emerge in 2024–2025, China and Russia might use BRICS (including sympathetic new members like Brazil or India who have offered mediation) to shape a negotiating framework, one that might be more favorable to Russia’s terms. Similarly, on contentious issues involving China – say the Taiwan issue or South China Sea disputes – Russia could rally BRICS statements supporting China’s position (we have already seen hints: in 2023, BRICS statements included lines about opposing “unilateral sanctions” and emphasizing non-interference, which indirectly back China and Russia’s stands on their respective issues).

Die expanded BRICS will also play into the future of Sino-Russian relations. Having helped create an enlarged bloc, Beijing and Moscow will work to institutionalize this new BRICS – possibly moving it from a loose forum to a more structured entity. This could involve establishing a permanent secretariat or more formal decision-making processes, an idea previously resisted but maybe necessary with more members. If that happens, expect China and Russia to ensure they have significant sway in any institutional setup (perhaps co-chairing key committees, etc.). They may also champion additional membership expansion (there is talk of a “BRICS+” continual enlargement or a second wave of members in the coming years). More than 30 countries had shown interest in joining cfr.org; China and Russia have signaled openness to bringing in some of them in a phased manner to further bolster the “Global South coalition” narrative cfr.org. Candidates like Turkey, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, or others might be evaluated. If those materialize, Sino-Russian coordination will be critical in vetting candidates (ensuring they align sufficiently with their vision) and persuading any reluctant current members.

Potential friction points identified earlier will remain, but both sides have strong incentives to manage them. The economic asymmetry will persist – in fact, with Russia’s economy under strain from prolonged war and sanctions, and China’s economy still several times larger despite its own challenges, Russia could become more economically dependent on China in relative terms through 2025–2030. This raises the question: Will Russia become a de facto junior partner? The evidence suggests it already has in many ways, but Russia will try to mitigate the political optics of this dependence. It will do so by maintaining active ties with other countries (India, Middle East, even attempts with Africa and Latin America) and bringing those connections into forums like BRICS, so that it’s not seen as reliant only on China. That aligns with China’s interests too – China doesn’t want a subservient client so much as a robust partner that can hold its own and bring additional allies to the table cepa.orgcepa.org. Thus, paradoxically, one way Russia copes with asymmetry is by broadening BRICS (which it did) and multi-aligning, which ultimately still complements Chinese strategy of building a broad anti-hegemonic front.

When it comes to differences over India or other third parties, these seem manageable for now. In the short term, India appears comfortable staying in BRICS alongside China and Russia, as long as BRICS serves its economic interests and doesn’t force it to choose sides. Russia will continue to act as a bridge between New Delhi and Beijing, which is actually a valuable role Beijing appreciates (better to have India inside BRICS where it can be engaged, rather than outside aligning solely with the West). If India-China relations improve, even marginally, that will ease one friction; if they worsen, Russia’s role as mediator will become even more crucial. But in either case, it’s hard to imagine India leaving BRICS, so the trio will find ways to coexist. For Russia and China, keeping India in the fold is strategically important to prevent BRICS from splitting or losing credibility as a “global” grouping (India’s presence shows it’s not just a China-Russia club). Therefore, Beijing and Moscow will likely coordinate quietly on how to handle India’s concerns – perhaps giving India leadership of certain BRICS initiatives (e.g., India leading on BRICS start-up forums or digital health, etc., as a way to keep it invested). This cooperative approach will reflect back positively on China-Russia ties, as they share the task of alliance management.

Another aspect of future cooperation could be in the realm of military or security arrangements tangential to BRICS. While BRICS itself is not a defense pact, the growing trust between China and Russia has seen more military collaboration (like joint patrols and drills). Some speculate that as BRICS expands, there could be more frequent China-Russia military exercises involving other BRICS partners (for instance, a naval exercise with South Africa in the Indian Ocean, which already happened in early 2023, or counter-terror drills with all SCO/BRICS members). These are symbolic but enhance interoperability and strategic understanding between China and Russia’s armed forces, indirectly strengthening their partnership.

In terms of official statements and summitry, expect continued exchanges of high-level visits and affirmations. Putin and Xi have met frequently and are likely to keep doing so annually or more, often on the sidelines of BRICS or SCO summits if not bilaterally. Their personal rapport adds momentum – as long as both remain in power, the political will for close ties remains solid. They often refer to the relationship being at its “historical best,” and that framing will persist in state media and speeches. Domestically, both leaderships use their partnership to bolster their narrative: Putin to show Russia isn’t isolated and has a superpower friend, Xi to show China is gaining loyal partners and reshaping global dynamics. This mutual PR value means neither will want a public falling out; disagreements, if any, will be resolved behind closed doors to maintain the facade of unity.

In the grand scope, the future development of Russia-China relations within BRICS is part of a larger trend: the emergence of a more multipolar or at least bifurcated world, where U.S.-led alliances are counterbalanced by coalitions like BRICS. China and Russia are co-leading this shift cepa.org. Their partnership has proven adaptive – it accelerated dramatically after 2014 when circumstances changed, and again after 2022. It has shown it can weather crises (Russia’s war, China’s worsening U.S. ties) and fill gaps for each other (economic for Russia, strategic support for China). Given this resilience, it’s reasonable to forecast that their alignment will endure through 2025 and beyond barring some major geopolitical realignment.

Certainly, challenges will test them – possibly an eventual diplomatic settlement in Ukraine (where China might push Russia to compromise more than Russia wants), or the outcome of global power shifts like the 2024 U.S. election which could alter Western approaches. But even if, say, a more conciliatory Western stance emerged, it’s unlikely to pry Beijing and Moscow apart easily, because their trust in the West is fundamentally broken and their core strategic aims (regime security, regional influence) conflict with Western liberal objectives cepa.org. They have built a relationship that transcends immediate geopolitics, rooted in long-term alignment of interests and grievances cepa.org.

In the words of one analysis, they have committed to a “long-term strategic partnership that transcends immediate geopolitical circumstances” cepa.org. We see this in how they remained aligned despite changes in U.S. administrations and global crises – the bond is more structural now, not easily swayed by tactical concessions from the West. As such, within BRICS, they will likely push forward with initiatives to redefine aspects of the world order: whether it’s creating parallel financial structures, championing UN reform that favors developing nations (but not at their own expense), or fostering a narrative of “Global South solidarity” against Western dominance. Their success in these endeavors could have far-reaching implications, potentially making BRICS a core pillar of a new international system. Even if some in the West dismiss BRICS as incoherent, China and Russia’s effective teamwork has already yielded tangible results – from expansion to financial institutions – that cannot be ignored cfr.orgcfr.org.

In conclusion, the Russian-Chinese partnership within BRICS is set to grow more robust, serving as a cornerstone of each country’s foreign policy. It is characterized by deepening economic interlinkages, closely coordinated diplomatic strategies, and a shared vision to reshape aspects of global governance to be more favorable to their interests and those of the developing world. There will be obstacles and subtle divergences to navigate, but both Beijing and Moscow have shown pragmatism and determination in handling them. As we move further into a decade marked by great power competition and realignments, the BRICS forum – augmented by new members and energized by Sino-Russian synergy – will be a central arena where Russia and China exercise joint leadership. Their ability to keep BRICS cohesive and effective will, in many ways, measure the success of their broader strategy to foster a multipolar world. For now, all signs indicate that Moscow and Beijing are both willing and prepared to carry this joint project forward, championing an alliance (informal yet strong) that they see as vital to securing their national interests in a changing international landscape cepa.orgcepa.org.

Sources: The analysis above draws on a range of reputable sources, including think-tank reports and official statements. Key insights on the political alignment of China and Russia come from a 2025 CEPA report, which describes their relationship as a flexible “friendship” with Russia often the junior partner cepa.orgcepa.org. The evolution of BRICS through expansion is documented in Council on Foreign Relations and Carnegie Endowment pieces, noting how China and Russia spearheaded the inclusion of new members while other BRICS members were more cautious cepa.orgcfr.org. Economic data, such as trade volumes and energy trade figures, are confirmed by sources like Reuters and MERICS – for instance, bilateral trade hitting $245 billion in 2024 reuters.com and Russia’s oil exports to China reaching record highs reuters.com. The push for Entdollarisierung and use of national currencies is evidenced by Putin’s remarks that almost 95% of trade with China is now in rubles and yuan theguardian.com and CEPA findings that roughly one-third of Russia’s foreign trade is conducted in yuan by end of 2023 cepa.org. Diplomatic coordination in multilateral settings, including the delicate handling of the Ukraine issue in BRICS statements, is detailed in the CEPA report and news analyses cepa.orgcepa.org. Potential frictions like the imbalance in the relationship and Russia’s ties with India are explored in studies by FPRI and others, highlighting data such as China comprising 36% of Russia’s trade vs Russia’s 5% of China’s fpri.org and noting Russia’s efforts to avoid choosing sides between China and India fpri.orgfpri.org. In sum, the source material consistently underscores the strengthening of the Sino-Russian strategic bond in recent years and provides context for understanding its future trajectory within BRICS and the international system.